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PREFACE
This is the ninth of a series of Working Papers prepared for the Pro-Poor Livestock
Policy Initiative (PPLPI). The purpose of these papers is to explore issues related to
livestock development in the context of poverty alleviation.
Livestock is vital to the economies of many developing countries. Animals are a
source of food, more specifically protein for human diets, income, employment and
possibly foreign exchange. For low income producers, livestock can serve as a store of
wealth, provide draught power and organic fertiliser for crop production and a means
of transport. Consumption of livestock and livestock products in developing countries,
though starting from a low base, is growing rapidly.
This paper analyzes the political economy of the livestock sector in two Indian states,
Andhra Pradesh and Orissa. The aim is to identify politically feasible interventions
that could have broad positive effects on poor rural livestock producers in these
states. To that end, the paper assesses the relationship between land, livestock, and
poverty, describes the organization of the sector, and analyzes the political and
bureaucratic interests shaping livestock policy.
We hope this paper will provide useful information to its readers and any feedback is
welcome by the author, PPLPI and the Livestock Information, Sector Analysis and
Policy Branch (AGAL) of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO).

Disclaimer
The designations employed and the presentation of material in this publication do not
imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Food and
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any
country, territory, city or area or its authorities or concerning the delimitations of its
frontiers or boundaries. The opinions expressed are solely those of the author(s) and
do not constitute in any way the official position of the FAO.

Author
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This paper analyzes the political economy of the livestock sector in two Indian states,
Andhra Pradesh and Orissa. The aim is to identify politically feasible interventions
that could have broad positive effects on poor rural livestock producers in these
states. To that end, the paper assesses the relationship between land, livestock, and
poverty, describes the organization of the sector, and analyzes the political and
bureaucratic interests shaping livestock policy.
A review of available data on livestock ownership, land, and poverty shows that
sectoral interventions must be carefully tailored to have pro-poor effects. Although
livestock holdings are widely distributed in Andhra Pradesh and Orissa, as elsewhere in
India, land ownership and livestock holdings are correlated. Poor livestock producers
tend to own little or no land; these producers are often of low social status as well.
Smallholders and landless households differ from other households in the mix of
animals that they own and their means of supporting these animals. Poor livestock
producers own fewer large ruminants (cows and buffaloes); they are more likely to
possess small ruminants (goats and sheep) and backyard poultry. Poor producers are
also more heavily dependent on common property resources—village pastures, water
tanks, and local forests—for the feed and fodder their animals need.
The distribution of benefits from sectoral interventions is shaped by these factors.
The impact of a dairy sector intervention will depend upon the resources required to
benefit from it; poor producers are unlikely to benefit from an intervention that
requires land or financial resources. For example, improvements in the functioning of
dairy cooperatives benefit all producers who own dairy animals. Provision of fodder
seeds, on the other hand, is likely to benefit only those with arable land in which to
sow the seeds. Measures that improve common resources or focus on small ruminants
are likely to benefit poor producers.
Livestock policy options are constrained by the broader political context. Because
livestock producers are not an organized political lobby, policy in this area is shaped
by broad policy trends and the agendas of more organized groups. Historically,
livestock sector policy has focused on large ruminants and the state has sought to
deliver necessary supportive services. This approach follows from the high political
salience of Hindu nationalism and a deeply embedded statist approach to policy in the
post-Independence period. Hindu nationalist groups have encouraged emphasis on
vegetarian-friendly livestock policies—promote dairy rather than meat—and placed
constraints on cow slaughter. Statist beliefs led the state to view provision of animal
health and breeding services as a state responsibility and facilitated direct
intervention in the cooperative sector. Recent sector reform policies reflect the
broad ideological shift towards liberalism of the last decade. Reforms have opened
the formal dairy market to private companies and imposed user charges for health
services. Reformers also seek to reduce government involvement in cooperatives and
propose to privatize veterinary practice. Such reforms place greater faith in the
ability of the market to allocate services and goods. It is argued that reform
implementation will be shaped by interested actors, such as state-employed
veterinarians, as well as market forces. Other policy trends, such as forest closure
and decentralization, have affected the livestock sector. All of these reforms will
affect poor livestock producers—the paper discusses the likely effect of each reform—,
but livestock producers have played little role in their development. However, those
cases in which livestock sector actors have organized, as in the case of sheep and goat
rearers in Andhra Pradesh and dairy cooperative sector leaders at the national level,
demonstrate that actors can influence the content and implementation of sector
policy within the broad constraints set by the political context.
Based on this analysis, the paper discusses several options for strategic intervention in
the livestock sector. The interventions with the greatest potential are the following.
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Executive summary

One, actors can seek to improve producers’ capacity to articulate and advocate their
interests. Two, actors can seek to increase access to shared resources such as forests
and pastures. Three, actors can encourage pro-poor implementation of animal health
service reforms. Four, actors can advocate further liberalization of the dairy sector.
Five, actors can support small ruminant production by improving feed and fodder and
conducting research on commodity chains and breeding.

v

INTRODUCTION
The livestock sector has significant potential for improving the livelihoods of landless
people and small and marginal farmers, who comprise the majority of India’s rural
poor. Many poor rural Indians own livestock and gain some income from it. At
present, resource and institutional constraints prevent poor producers from realizing
the full potential of their animals. Expansion in the domestic livestock products
market presents an opportunity for gain. Forecasters believe that domestic demand
for dairy and meat products will grow substantially in the near future (Delgado et al.
1999). Strategic intervention is required to ensure that poor producers secure a
greater share of the benefits from this expanding market.
This paper analyzes the livestock sector in Andhra Pradesh and Orissa, situating these
cases in the national context. These states were selected because they are actively
pursuing sectoral development and reform; they do not represent the full diversity of
India’s livestock production systems, agroclimatic conditions, or political
environments and are not meant to be representative in this sense.1 Close attention
to these cases can contribute to effective interventions in these states and elsewhere
in India. Dairy and meat marketing, fodder and grazing issues, and animal health
services are relevant throughout India. The analysis focuses on poor rural livestock
producers; this paper does not investigate the impact of policies on livestock
consumers or peri-urban livestock producers.
Throughout, the paper highlights key factors affecting the political, social, and
economic environment in which poor rural livestock producers attempt to secure a
livelihood. The central concern is the interaction between the animals producers
raise—cows, buffaloes, sheep, goats, poultry—and their environment rather than on
divisions among poor producers.2 The aim is to identify leverage points with potential
for broad positive effects on poor producers. Thus, the analysis presents broad
generalizations regarding issues such as caste, land ownership, and local politics.
Although little space is devoted to the complexities of these issues, the analysis seeks
to be sensitive to the differential policy effects that may arise from characteristics
such as remote location or social disadvantage.
The paper is structured as follows. Section I provides an overview of the relationship
between land, livestock, and poverty in India, Andhra Pradesh, and Orissa. This
overview highlights the two parts of the sector with greatest potential for pro-poor
interventions: dairy and small ruminant meat production. Section II provides an
overview of the livestock sector. The political context surrounding livestock policy is
discussed, highlighting constraints imposed by ‘cow’ politics, and the dominant policy
approach and the organization of service delivery, processing, and marketing to 1991
are described. The actors and interests served by that system are identified. Section
III focuses on sector reform efforts since 1991, the year in which the Government of
India committed the country to market liberalization. Recent reform efforts in India,
Andhra Pradesh, and Orissa are summarized, implementation prospects are analyzed,
and their potential impact on poor livestock producers is evaluated. Because there
are important linkages between state and national reforms, the discussion is ordered
by theme rather than state or level of government. The concluding section reviews
several options for strategic intervention, describing and analyzing their prospects. It
is recommended that actors focus on improving producers’ capacity to articulate and
advocate their interests, increasing access to shared resources such as forests and
pastures, encouraging pro-poor implementation of animal health service reforms,
advocating further liberalization of the dairy sector, and gathering information on
small ruminant commodity chains and breeding.
1

Andhra Pradesh and Orissa are neighbouring states in eastern India.
This paper does not analyze the distribution of benefits or division of responsibilities within poor livestock
producing households, and thus it neglects gender issues. See the following for extensive discussion of these
issues (Katticaren 2000; Bravo-Baumann 2000; Pradhan, Ahuja, and Venkatramaiah 2003; Ramdas and
Seethalakshmi 1999).
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SECTION I: LAND, LIVESTOCK, AND POVERTY IN INDIA, ANDHRA
PRADESH AND ORISSA
India has 36 percent of the poor people in the world.3 About 433 million Indians (44
percent) lived on less than $1 a day in 1997 (World Development Indicators 2000).
Official statistics classified roughly 36 percent of the population as poor in 1993-1994.
Indian poverty is largely a rural phenomenon. About 75 percent of the poor reside in
rural areas (World Bank 2001). Roughly 33 percent of rural residents were considered
poor by the Government of India in 1991, as compared to 18 percent of urban
residents (Drèze and Sen 1995). Table 1 presents information on urban and rural
poverty in Andhra Pradesh and Orissa. Most locate the causes of rural poverty in slow
agricultural growth rates, low factor productivity, and inequitable access to land and
other inputs (Mearns 1999).
Table 1: Poverty in Orissa and Andhra Pradesh.
% of individuals who are

Rural Andhra
Pradesh
Urban Andhra
Pradesh
Rural Orissa
Urban Orissa

Head count ratio of poverty

# of
households

Scheduled
Castes

Scheduled
Tribes

All

Scheduled
Castes

Scheduled
Tribes

4,908

19.3

9.5

27.7

43.8

41.2

3,644

8.5

2.8

36.1

41.0

43.7

3,338

18.5

25.2

51.9

57.2

76.9

1,037

13.1

11.9

39.7

45.5

61.6

Poverty rates are based on the official poverty line. This poverty line is state-specific and is
derived separately for rural and urban areas.
Source: Household level data, 50th round of NSS Consumer Expenditure Survey 1993-94 (Meenakshi, Ray,
and Gupta 2000).

Rural poverty is closely linked to land ownership and to social status. Approximately
84 percent of rural Indian households operate less than 2 hectares of land; the other
16 percent operate almost 66 percent of the land (See Table 2).4 Land may be
distributed more inequitably than official figures suggest as some large landholders
distributed formal ownership among family members to evade land ceilings. Many
households own too little productive land to rely solely on its products for subsistence.
However, those households that manage to secure a livelihood from their land are less
likely to be poor than those dependent on agriculture wage labour (Agarwal 1994).
There is little reason to expect a dramatic shift in land distribution in the short term.

3

The figures reported in this paragraph are not wholly consistent. Poverty figures depend on the measures
used, the population sampled, and a host of other factors. There is an active debate on appropriate measures
and poverty trends in India.
4
Of course, quantitative data on land ownership and operation tells us little of its quality; an acre of irrigated
land and an acre of rain-fed land are not the same.
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Table 2: Rural land ownership.
Percentage distribution of households and area operated by size class of operational holdings
India
Percent of Percent of
households
operated
area

Andhra Pradesh
Percent of Percent of
households
operated
area

Orissa
Percent of
Percent of
households
operated
area

Landless
(0-.002 ha)

21.8

-

37.5

-

27.2

-

Marginal
(.002-1 ha)

48.3

15.5

36.9

17.5

43.5

22.0

Small (1-2 ha)

14.2

18.6

13.3

23.0

17.9

30.3

Semi-Medium
(2-4 ha)

9.7

24.2

8.4

26.5

8.8

27.8

Medium (4-10 ha)

4.9

26.5

3.4

23.6

2.5

16.3

Large (>10 ha)

1.1

15.2

0.5

9.5

0.2

3.7

Source: 48th NSS Land and Livestock holdings survey, 1991-1992 (National Sample Survey Organisation.
Department of Statistics. Government of India. 1997).

Table 1 presents information on the relationship between social status and poverty.
Low caste and out caste status continues to be correlated with poverty. The
populations of Andhra Pradesh and Orissa comprise a substantial proportion of dalits
(scheduled castes) and advivasis (scheduled tribes).5 Dalits are present in most
districts, but adivasis are concentrated in the forest, mountainous, and remote areas.
Much of the land in which adivasis reside is owned by the state, at least formally, or
controlled by non-adivasis (Mohanty 1997). Thus, producers in these areas do not
have full control over the land used for livestock production. The 1991 census listed
62 distinct adivasi groups in Orissa. Although the table does not provide data on
nomadic communities, informants indicated that there are pastoralist and
sedentarized communities in Andhra Pradesh. Pastoralists tend to possess a greater
number of livestock per capita than other groups. Pastoralist communities often lack
political influence, but they are not necessarily poor by standard measures (Agrawal
1999).
For the most part, land ownership and social caste continue to serve as indicators of
political influence or lack thereof. Despite increased mobilization by dalits and
adivasis in recent decades, research in Andhra Pradesh and Orissa indicates that large
land owners and upper caste individuals continue to exert disproportionate influence
in local, district, and state level decisions (Reddy 1989; Manor 2000; Mohanty 1996).
Poor rural livestock producers tend to own little arable land and often come from
socially marginalized groups.
Both land ownership and social caste are relevant to livestock production. The
amount of land one owns affects one’s ability to support livestock. Those with ample
private lands have greater crop residues and may be able to raise fodder crops. Most
producers, however, depend partially or wholly on crop residues and common
property resources—such as village pastures, tanks, and local forests. Jodha’s classic
study found that 84 to 100 percent of poor households in dry regions were dependent
5
The terms Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe are used to refer to those historically marginalized groups
that are granted special protections in the Constitution. Scheduled castes refers to “untouchables” and
scheduled tribes refers to “tribal” peoples. Dalit and adivasi are the terms contemporary representatives of
these groups use most frequently.
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on common property resources (CPRs) for food, fuel, fodder, and fibre while only 10
to 28 percent of large farmers gathered these items from common areas (Jodha 1986).
Animal grazing in CPRs accounted for 69 to 89 percent of grazing for livestock owned
by poor households and 11 to 42 percent of grazing from rich households. That study,
and many others, also found that the quantity and quality of common lands has
declined substantially since Independence.
Social caste affects livestock production by constraining access to services and
resources. Higher caste individuals are frequently unwilling to provide services to
low/out-caste livestock producers because contact with “untouchables” is perceived
to pollute oneself. However, out-caste individuals may provide services to higher
caste individuals if they observe proper protocol. Ethnicity may also influence dietary
practices and thus local markets. Informants indicated that adivasis in Orissa were
generally non-vegetarian and consumed less milk than non-adivasis (Mittal et al.
1999). Thus, one would expect a stronger local market for meat in mostly adivasi
areas. The potential for dairy would depend on access to nonlocal markets but should
be lower than in milk-consuming areas.
Historically, livestock were integrated into a mixed agricultural-livestock system.
Livestock tilled fields, fed on crop residues, and fertilized the fields with their
manure; and provided milk and meat for household consumption, celebrations, and
religious festivals.6 As farmers have become more integrated into markets, sale of
livestock products has come to comprise a significant share of household incomes.
Kurup (2003) estimates that livestock comprises 30 percent of household income in
Orissa; agricultural or wage income remains primary for most. Income from livestock
can balance that from agriculture. Agricultural income is episodic and depends on a
successful season. Dairy can provide regular income and meat animals provide a
ready source of cash on demand.
In 1999-2000, livestock comprised 5.5 percent of India’s gross domestic product
(GDP).7 While this figure is dwarfed by the total contribution of agriculture (24.85
percent), livestock’s share in the agricultural GDP has grown slightly over time. The
gross value of livestock sector output was about Rs. 130,234 crore; the GDP of the
livestock GDP sector comprised Rs. 984 billion (roughly US$22.6 billion).8 Dairy
products garner the greatest proportion of output value (64.6 percent); meat and
meat products accounted for 18.5 percent of output value. Other outputs include
dung (8.6 percent), eggs (3.3 percent) and hair or fibre products (8.6 percent). The
majority of livestock products are consumed domestically. In 1999-2000 livestock
export earnings were only Rs. 2,000 crore (US$460 million). Meat and meat products
and leather and leather products comprise more than 90 percent of livestock sector
exports. Analyses indicate that substantial reductions in international trade barriers
and improvements in domestic processes (disease control, packaging, etc) would be
required for India to gain a larger share of world markets (Sharma and Sharma 2002;
Sharma and Gulati 2003). Small producers are unlikely to play a major role in
production for export in the near term.9
As Tables 3-10 demonstrate, livestock ownership is distributed less inequitably than
arable land. The majority of livestock are held by smallholders operating less than 2
hectares of land. Many landless households own some livestock. However, there is a
6
Sale of animal fibres (wool) and skin (leather) is not an important source of income in Andhra Pradesh and
Orissa.
7
Sources: Website of the national Department of Animal Husbandry & Dairying (cited as GOI 2003b-d), Sharma
and Sharma (2002), and GOI (2003a).
This figure excludes animal (draught) power, which was valued at Rs. 4,000-9,500 crore (Government of India.
Planning Commission 2002). Some experts believe this figure to be low. One crore = 10 million (10,000,000)
8

As of January 1, 2000, US$1 = Rs. 45.98.
Some dairy cooperatives, such as GCMMF market dairy products abroad. However, these sales comprise a
small share of their total earnings.
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positive relationship between land and livestock ownership. This pattern is most
evident for large ruminants (cattle and buffalo). A much smaller proportion of
landless households than households with medium to large holdings had dairy animals
that were giving milk during the 1993-1994 National Sample Survey (See Table 5).
Inequity in large ruminants is less evident in Orissa than Andhra Pradesh. There were
at least 10 productive animals for every 100 households at every land possession
category in Orissa while there were only 6 in-milk buffaloes for every 100 landless
households in Andhra Pradesh.
Goats are frequently referred to as “small man’s cow;” this label aptly reflects the
profile of most goat owners, who possess, on average, less than a hectare of land per
household. The landless are better represented among sheep and goat producers than
among dairy producers. Reliance on sheep and goats may reflect a decline in the
common resources on which landless households and smallholders depend; goats are
able to survive on degraded land where cows would not survive (Jodha 1991). The
figures regarding poultry ownership should be treated with caution for it is not clear
whether this data reflects the effects of the “poultry revolution” in which intensive
poultry production became widespread.
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Table 3: Land and livestock ownership in Indian rural areas.
Possession of milch animals

Landless (0-.01 ha)
Marginal (.01-1.0 ha)
Small (1-2 ha)
Semi-medium
(2-4 ha)
Medium & Large
(4.01 + ha)
All households

Possession of draught animals

Cows
only

Buffalos
only

Cows &
Buffalos

Others

None

Not
recorded

A pair or
more

Single

None

Not
recorded

7%
22%
33%

6%
15%
24%

1%
4%
9%

0%
0%
0%

82%
55%
31%

4%
4%
3%

1%
18%
43%

2%
9%
12%

96%
73%
45%

0%
0%
0%

32%

28%

14%

0%

23%

3%

51%

12%

37%

0%

27%

28%

27%

0%

14%

4%

54%

14%

32%

0%

22%

16%

6%

0%

53%

4%

21%

8%

70%

0%

Source: NSS 50th Round, Quinquennial survey of consumer expenditures.

Table 4: Equity in livestock ownership in Orissa: Livestock ownership and land possession.
Landholding
Landless
(0-.002 ha)
Marginal (.002-1 ha)
Small
(1-2 ha)l
Semi-Medium (2-4 ha)
Medium (4-10 ha)
Large (>10 ha)

Proportion of
Households

Proportion of
Cattle

Proportion
of Buffalo

Proportion of
Sheep & Goat

Proportion
of Pigs

Proportion of
Poultry

27.2

8.62

0.00

25.08

0.00

44.66

43.5

64.79

22.75

51.04

25.49

39.49

17.9

17.73

28.57

11.37

31.37

8.01

8.8
2.5
0.2

5.83
2.64
0.22

14.29
33.33
1.06

8.26
3.43
0.05

31.37
11.76
0.00

4.53
2.49
0.82

Source: Land data is from 48th NSS Land and Livestock holdings survey. Livestock data are from Orissa LSR Field Survey 1999 (Kurup 2003).
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Table 5: Ownership of productive dairy animals and rural land ownership.
In-milk large ruminants owned per 100 households
Andhra Pradesh
Xbred
Cows
3
2

Revised Landless
Marginal
Small (1-2)
Semi-Medium (2-4)
Medium (4-10)
Large

3
5
4

Orissa

Desi Cows

Buffalo

29
20

6
41
55

Xbred
Cows
1
5
3

28
18
16

56
74
126

7
6
0

Desi Cows

Buffalo

11
20
39

2
3

26
42
69

2
11
0

Source: 48th NSS Land and Livestock holdings survey, 1991-1992.

Table 6: Ownership of productive cows and Rural Land Ownership in Andhra Pradesh.
Adult female cows owned per 100 households
Not calved
once

In-milk

Dry

Others

All

Size Class of
Household operational holding

Xbred

Desi

Xbred

Desi

Xbred

Desi

Revised Landless
Marginal
Small (1-2)
Semi-Medium (2-4)

3
80
89
114

0
0

1
1

3
2
3

29
20
28

3
2
2

2
10
11
9

2
3
1

Medium (4-10)
Large

85
72

0
0

0
0

5
4

18
16

2
6

13
14

4
3

Source: 48th NSS Land and Livestock holdings survey, 1991-1992.
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Table 7: Ownership of productive cows and rural land ownership in Orissa.
Adult female cows owned per 100 households
Not calved once
Xbred
Desi
0
0

Revised Landless

In-milk
Xbred
Desi
0.5
11

Others

All

Xbred
0.5

Dry
Desi
1.5

0.5

13.5

Marginal
Small (1-2)
Semi-Medium (2-4)
Medium (4-10)

0
0
0
2

6
4
3
0

5
3
7
6

20
39
26
42

3
2
5
9

34
56
39
52

3.5
3
6
6

70.5
108
86
118

Large

0

0

0

69

0

95

75

239

Source: 48th NSS Land and Livestock holdings survey, 1991-1992.

Table 8:

Household possession of large ruminants in rural areas.
Possession of milch animals

All-India
Andhra
Pradesh
Orissa

Possession of draught animals

Cows
only

Buffalos
only

Cows &
Buffalos

Others

None

Not
recorded

A pair or
more

Single

None

Not
recorded

22%

16%

6%

3%

53%

0%

21%

8%

70%

0%

8%

17%

3%

0%

73%

0%

17%

4%

79%

0%

29%

2%

1%

1%

68%

0%

32%

8%

60%

0%

Source: NSS 50th Round, Quinquennial survey of consumer expenditures.
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Table 9: Selected household attributes and ownership of large ruminants in rural India.
Possession of milch animals

Agricultural
Labour
Self-employed
in Agriculture
Scheduled
Tribes
Scheduled
Castes

Possession of Draught Animals

Cows
only

Buffalos
only

Cows &
Buffalos

Others

None

Not
recorded

A pair
or more

Single

None

Not
recorded

16%

9%

2%

4%

68%

0%

10%

6%

84%

0%

31%

27%

12%

3%

28%

0%

42%

12%

45%

0%

26%

7%

4%

5%

59%

0%

35%

10%

56%

0%

19%

12%

3%

5%

61%

0%

13%

7%

80%

0%

Source: NSS 50th Round, Quinquennial survey of consumer expenditures.

Table 10: Small animals and rural land ownership.
Animals owned per 100 households

Revised Landless
Marginal
Small (1-2)
Semi-Medium (24)
Medium (4-10)
Large

Andhra Pradesh
Sheep & Goats
Poultry
21
125
119
221

Orissa
Sheep & Goats
55
70

Poultry
489
316

145

191

75

312

121

293

112

373

156
18

237
167

167
259

696
2642

Source: 48th NSS Land and Livestock holdings survey, 1991-1992.

Inequity in ownership of livestock has important implications for pro-poor
interventions. Because the majority of livestock are owned by small holders and
landless people, almost any intervention that benefits livestock producers can be said
to be pro-poor. This view is often advanced in policy documents and was by several
informants. But it is not the case that all livestock producers will benefit equally from
intervention. Factors affecting the distribution of benefits from an intervention
include the animals included, the risk involved, and the other inputs required to
benefit from the intervention. For example, improvements in the functioning of dairy
cooperatives benefit all producers who own dairy animals. Provision of fodder seeds,
on the other hand, is likely to benefit only those with arable land in which to sow the
seeds.10 The livestock most commonly raised in Andhra Pradesh and Orissa are
discussed briefly in the paragraphs that follow.
Animals differ substantially in the investment required and the potential profit. Table
11 provides information regarding local market prices in Orissa. Large ruminants are
raised primarily for dairy products and draught power. Dairy animals require a greater
10

The ILRI Project on Multiple Use Crops could diminish the trade off between food crops and fodder crops.

9

Section I: Land, livestock, and poverty in India, Andhra Pradesh and Orissa

investment in cash (purchase) and need more feed, fodder, and time to reach
productivity. In return, they offer a steady income that may be quite substantial.
Dairy producers located in areas served by a cooperative system receive a regular
payment for their milk throughout the year; producers may also sell to informal
traders or private companies. Because cooperative payments are based on milk fat
ratios, buffalo milk is more profitable than cow milk. The potential for profit appears
to be greater for dairy than meat animals, although this is limited by difficulties in
disposing of unproductive cows (See Section II). Draught animals also require a
substantial investment, and ownership may seem uneconomic for small holders who
make use of the animals for only a small proportion of the year (See GOI-NLP 1996:
4.3, Kurup 2003: Chapter 4). However, access to draught power is critical during the
tilling period. In the absence of lease markets that serve small and marginal farmers
at those times, many will choose to retain draught animals.
Table 11: Market prices for livestock products in Orissa.
Local Market Price

Notes

Milk

Rs. 6-10/litre

Goats

Rs. 700-900

Weight ~10-15 kg. Body weight is
not publicly assessed.

Sheep
Pigs
Poultry
Dung

Rs. 500-600
Rs. 1200-1500
R50-80/kg
Rs. 80-100/cartload

Weight ~10-15 kg.
Weight ~50 kg.
Most sales occur within the village

Source: Field study of livestock practices in Orissa (Mittal et al. 1999).

The domestic market for meat is substantial; about 68 percent of Indians are not
vegetarian (Mehta et al. 2002). Tables 12 and 13 present information on Indian meat
consumption. For the most part, rearing meat animals requires less investment from
producers. The most common meat animals in the case study states were goats,11
sheep, and poultry. These small animals are less expensive to purchase and require
less feed and fodder to gain sufficient weight to be profitably marketed. The profit
from meat animals depends in part on time of sale; meat animals are most profitable
during the wedding and festival seasons.

11

Goat milk does not comprise a significant share of marketed milk in Andhra Pradesh or Orissa.
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Table 12: Indian meat consumption: Market shares of various meats (Percent) (Mehta et al.
2002).

Year
1978

Beef
34

Buffalo
34

Mutton/Lamb
6

Goat
12

Pork
10

Poultry
4

1988
1998
2001

33
31
30

32
31
30

5
4
3

13
10
8

10
10
7

7
13
22

Source: FAO Production Yearbook.

Table 13: Percentage of households consuming meat, fish, and eggs 1993-1994 (Mehta et al.
2002)
State

Rural

Urban

Andhra Pradesh
Orissa

Goat
22.4
14.2

Poultry
18.4
9.1

Fish
25.9
58.6

Eggs
52.3
12.2

Goat
20.3
41.3

Poultry
19.4
6.2

Fish
20.6
63.7

Eggs
57.2
34.2

All India

20.3

7.5

30.7

22.0

28.0

9.0

27.1

34.9

Source: National Sample Survey.

Since the “poultry revolution,” organized intensive production has come to dominate
markets for eggs and broilers. Participation in intensive poultry requires a substantial
investment in pedigreed birds, facilities, cages, and purchased feed. Mehta et al
(2002) describe a small farm as one with 3,000-10,000 birds. This subsector is
dominated by “gentleman farmers” as one informant described them. However, many
smallholders have continued to raise backyard poultry for profit. The persistence of
backyard poultry may reflect the spatial concentration of intensive poultry. Intensive
poultry producers have focused on the urban market, and many of these producers are
located in peri-urban areas where transport is easier. Over time, however, intensive
producers may capture rural markets as well. Because the potential of backyard
poultry appeared to be limited by the intensive poultry sector, this sub-sector did not
receive close examination.12
Observers often describe the Indian livestock production system as low input, low
output, but nevertheless it could be argued that this system is highly efficient. Most
producers expend little cash on food for their animals. Instead of stall feeding or
raising fodder-specific crops, producers let their animals forage for fodder in
harvested fields, village pastures, local forests, and along roadsides, either with a
herder or on their own.13 This system is perceived as low output by conventional
measures14 such as litres of milk produced, animal weight at sale, and one would
expect livestock to be more productive when provided with a better diet. Ahuja,
Morrenhoff and Sen’s 2002 study of livestock-owning households in Orissa provides
suggestive evidence. They report that average annual milk production for in-milk
12

Some argue that backyard poultry may be able to survive competition with intensively produced broilers. At
present, it seems, backyard poultry command a price premium for their superior taste. Backyard poultry
producers are unlikely to compete successfully with intensively produced layers because fertilized eggs do not
travel well.

13

There is, of course, substantial regional variation in livestock rearing practices. Use of stall feeding and
purchased feed is more common in places where cooperative dairy is very successful.
14
These indicators may exclude other factors important to small producers.
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crossbred cows was 850 litres for the poorest 20 percent of households and 1219 litres
for the top 20 percent.15 It is due to the fact that the richer households provide their
animals with superior inputs. Extension may improve producers’ awareness of animal
needs, but it is not clear that small producers have sufficient resources to garner
these inputs.16
The section that follows focuses on the politics and institutional structure of the
livestock sector—including dairy, meat, and health services. The dairy and meat
subsectors are the only ones in Andhra Pradesh and Orissa that have both substantial
participation by poor rural producers and high potential for benefit. The return from
all types of livestock is constrained by lack of access to animal health and breeding
services, by the structure of the market, and by the inputs (feed and fodder) received
by livestock.
Discussion of inputs—which are most affected by policies and
organizations not focused on livestock—begins in Section III.

15

It should be noted that Orissa has the lowest bovine milk productivity in India. The authors were interested
in demand for livestock services and thus restricted their sample to households that own livestock; an asset
index was used to determine household wealth. Crossbred cattle comprised a smaller share of cattle stock in
the poorest households (about 6 percent) than in the richest households (close to 10 percent).

16

Whether small producers could provide better inputs would depend on factors such as the size of investment
required, the cost/benefit ratio, and access to credit. Productivity might also increase if producers were to
shift breeds. This issue is discussed further in subsequent sections.
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Livestock policy has rarely been a high priority for ambitious politicians and
bureaucrats in Andhra Pradesh and Orissa. Livestock comprises a small share of GDP
and a small percentage of state investment (0.4-1.0%). Although livestock producers
comprise a substantial share of the population, they are not an important, organized
political interest group. Strategic political entrepreneurs are more likely to use
identity (as Hindu, Muslim, dalit, adivasi) or their primary livelihood (agriculture) as a
catalyst for mobilizing producers. There is little reason to believe that producers’
votes for state and national candidates are based on their livestock policy platforms.
Although there is greater scope for self-organization and advocacy on behalf of
producers (see Section IV), it is unlikely that the sector will garner the attention
devoted to telecommunications, energy, or caste reservation policies.
Despite the low political profile of livestock, India’s political economy has an immense
impact on the sector. Caste hierarchies and religious divisions shape the options
policymakers consider, the priorities of bureaucrats and service providers, and the
strategies producers adopt. Since Independence, formal Indian livestock policy largely
has been driven by dairy—and thus by cows and buffalos. The Anand model, extended
through Operations Flood I, II, and III, and breeding interventions have attracted the
attention of researchers, policy makers, and donors. Yet the political economy of
Indian livestock should not be reduced to large ruminants. Cow and dairy politics are
an important part of the sector—and are discussed in the following section—but so are
goat politics, vaccination politics, and trade and liberalization politics. This sectoral
overview begins with a brief discussion of ‘cow’ politics. It then shifts to major
sector-specific interventions and the organizational structure that has resulted.
Discussion of policies in related sectors—such as fodder and grazing—is reserved for
Section III.

‘Cow’ politics
Although the Indian state is secular, there have been organized constituencies seeking
a Hindu rashtra (state) since shortly after Independence (Graham 1990; Jaffrelot
1996). The Hindu nationalist Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) has been associated
with the Jana Sangh family of parties, of which the governing Bharatiya Janata Party
(BJP) is a descendent. The right of centre BJP has led the national government for
most of the period since 1996. It is closely allied with nationalist groups and has
astutely used Hindu nationalist rhetoric to attract followers, allying with regional
parties in areas where the appeal of Hindutva (Hinduness) is limited (Kohli 1998; Pai
1998; Thakur 1998).17 Although the BJP has moderated its nationalist rhetoric
somewhat since the early 1990s, Hindutva remains a central part of the party’s
identity. It is thus understandable that politicians and bureaucrats have been
reluctant to adopt policies that conflict with popular understandings of Hinduism.18
Most relevant to livestock policy are the special symbolic accord granted to cows and
the association of vegetarianism with high caste (purity) and meat consumption with
low caste.19 Cow slaughter is seen to be contrary to Hindu religious dictates, and
17

The Bharatiya Janata Party is the largest party within the ruling National Democratic Alliance. The BJP’s
strongest political support comes from the “Hindi heartland” of Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, and Madhya Pradesh and
its outskirts—Gujarat, Maharashtra, and Rajasthan. The BJP garnered 25.6 percent of all votes in the 1998
elections but controlled 40.6 percent of the vote with its allies, enough to form a government.
18
This discussion draws from Robbins (1999) and field observations and interviews.
“Popular” may be a misleading term; there is little empirical work on perceptions of meat consumption.
Scriptural and historical analyses indicate that the relationship between Hinduism and meat consumption is
more complex than Hindu nationalists suggest (see cites in Noronha 1994; Robbins 1999).
19
Kala (1994) estimated that 30 percent of Indian Hindus were nonvegetarian (cited in Robins 1999). Experts
expect meat consumption to rise over time.
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some Hindus regard beef consumption as sacrilegious. Open cow slaughter is rare in
most parts of India.20 It seems that social pressure has been sufficient to prevent nonHindus (such as Muslims, Christians) from openly engaging in this practice.
Despite its rarity, cow slaughter has served as a symbolic issue for Hindu nationalists.
The Constitution directs the State to take steps to prohibit cow slaughter (Art. 48).
Nationalist groups have sought enactment of cow slaughter bans in each state and by
the central government for several decades (see Robbins 1999). Cow slaughter is
illegal in Andhra Pradesh and Orissa. State laws tend to be more severe in northern
and western states (GOI-NLP 1996). News reports indicate that a national ban on cow
slaughter is under consideration by the BJP.
There is little prospect for a near term shift away from anti-cow slaughter policies.
There is no organized constituency for cow slaughter and little incentive for creating
one because laxity in enforcement of cow slaughter bans allows those who desire to
consume beef to do so discretely. Those who wish to slaughter beef openly in
northern India must weigh the costs of the communal violence it could catalyze.
Hindu-Muslim conflict has led to hundreds of deaths in the last decade. Non-Hindus
do not seem to view this issue as worth the controversy.21 Non-vegetarians can openly
purchase poultry, chevron (goat), mutton, lamb, pork, and buffalo, and consume beef
discretely.
Social and legal barriers to cow slaughter have important consequences for the
livestock sector. First, the ban poses a serious barrier to breed improvement and
population control.22 Breed improvement generally involves selection for superior
animals—those who perform best in the areas of concern (e.g., milk production,
draught power). Animals whose performance is inferior are usually culled or
prevented from reproducing. Slaughter bans remove the option of culling,23 and
castration does not appear to be widespread.24 Instead, unproductive animals often
are abandoned by their owners and left to wander. These animals consume scarce
fodder and may continue to reproduce. Illegal slaughter produces low-quality beef for
local consumption. Other animals are smuggled along the informal trade routes to
neighbouring countries (Bangladesh), ports (Kolkatta, Mumbai) or states where
slaughter is legal (Tamil Nadu and Kerala); this however does not seem to be highly
profitable for producers.
Second, barriers to cow slaughter reduce the incentive for raising cattle (Noronha
1994; Robbins 1999). Because use is limited to dairy and draught power—and it is
difficult to dispose of useless animals—investment in cattle may be less profitable
than in other animals such as buffaloes.25 The sanctions against cow slaughter have
been sufficient to prevent the production of cattle and buffalo for meat in India (GOINLP 1996); most bovine meat is residual and of low quality.
Third, the social stigma attached to slaughter imposes substantial humanitarian costs
on some communities. Dalits have traditionally been held responsible for disposal of
dead cattle; this task provides one rationale for untouchability. Because this task is
20

Cow slaughter and beef consumption are legal in Kerala, which has a substantial Christian population.
Slaughter is legal in Tamil Nadu. Southern and eastern slaughter laws often permit some slaughter of
unproductive animals (GOI-NLP 1996).
21
Noronha comments “to the BJP’s dismay the passing of the recent cattle protection bill [in Delhi] did not
raise even a semblance of protest from the Muslims.” (1994: 1448)
22
Most of the interviewees with a concern for breed improvement raised this issue without prompting.
23
The National Livestock Sector Policy Review notes that liberal slaughter laws permit slaughter of the
unproductive. In practice, this has meant “the old and the infirm, sterile or infertile female, and …
malnourished” (Section 4.2.2). Young cattle whose performance is substandard are unlikely to fit these
criteria.
24

A few informants suggested that humane castration could be consistent with Hinduism.
Whether this is true in practice would depend on local conditions such as available fodder, the productivity
of cattle, and the market for dairy as compared to meat.

25

14

Section II: Sectoral overview

socially stigmatized, however, neither veterinarians nor human health professionals
have devoted attention to addressing the health risks posed by this trade. The
recurrent outbreaks of anthrax among dalits in Orissa are evidence of their continued
marginalization.26
Cow slaughter politics set the context in which state livestock sector policies
developed. The section that follows discusses the most important state interventions
and analyzes their impact on livestock production, processing, and marketing. These
interventions have focused on the market for dairy and animal health and breeding
services. There has been very limited government investment in extension; efforts to
increase producers’ awareness and skills have been extremely limited. All of these
sectors influence the welfare of poor rural livestock producers.

State involvement in cooperative dairy
The most important state and central government interventions in the livestock sector
involve the market for milk. The Anand (Gujarat) experience provided the basis for
state policies, and thus this section begins with a brief summary of the Anand story.27
Dairy cooperative societies in Gujarat first developed from the bottom-up. Local
producers in Anand organized themselves to resist exploitation from a British trader.
With assistance from an astute engineer—Verghese Kurien—farmers gradually
developed a cooperative model that enabled rural producers to supply urban milk
markets (initially Bombay now Mumbai) without reliance on traders. Over time, the
Anand model came to comprise a three-tiered structure of village dairy societies,
district unions, and a state milk marketing cooperative federation; a national
federation was later created. Each cooperative member had one vote in society
decisions; all producers (from those with one cow or buffalo to those with 5 or 6) were
at least formally equal.
The cooperative approach allowed rural producers to capture a greater share of the
profits from milk sales;28 this was the primary incentive for producers to join.
Additionally, the cooperatives sought to provide a consistent outlet for surplus milk at
stable prices, both during the dry season—when supply is low and prices high—and
during the flush season—when supply is ample and prices lower—by processing excess
milk into products such as powdered milk and curds (yogurt). In return for this
consistent buyer, however, producers had to subject their milk to regular testing.
Cooperative payments for milk were and are based on fat content; milk is tested each
and every time a producer supplies milk. Private milk traders did not test the milk
they collected, and thus producers (and traders) had greater opportunity to water
milk.
Anand became the model for Operations Flood I and II, III, (1970-1996), in which
Anand Milk Union Limited (Amul), the government of India, the World Bank, and
international donors sought to replicate the Anand model across India. The National
Dairy Development Board (NDDB) and the Indian Dairy Corporation (IDC) were created
to shepherd this expansion; the IDC has been merged into NDDB. Each Operation
Flood phase targeted a set of states; a subset of districts then was selected for dairy
development. Andhra Pradesh was included in all phases of Operation Flood, and
Orissa entered the programme in phase II (1981).

26

There were several TV and news stories on this issue in June and early July 2003. It appears that medical
practitioners were slow to intervene—there were several fatalities—and do not track disease outbreaks.
27
There is substantial disagreement over the key factors driving Anand and the Operation Floods that followed.
See the following references (Alderman, Mergos, and Slade 1987; Candler and Kumar 1998; Doornbos et al.
1990).
28
All milk does not enter the market; a substantial proportion of milk is consumed within the household where
it was produced.
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The Operation Flood (OF) expansion effort differed from the Anand experience in two
ways that help to account for the generally inferior performance of the resulting
cooperatives.29 First, the new cooperatives developed in a highly protected market
and received substantial subsidies. The formal dairy sector was reserved for
cooperatives until 1991. New private sector actors (foreign and domestic) were
required to obtain licenses to enter the sector; few were granted.30 All dairy food aid
was canalized through the Indian Dairy Corporation;31 and revenues from sales were
directed to the cooperative infrastructure. Societies, unions, and federations in
Operation Flood areas received substantial financial, technical, and material
assistance.32 Substantial resources were invested in creating a system that was safe
and hygienic. Unlike the Anand cooperative, therefore, OF dairy cooperatives did not
face open competition nor hard profit incentives from the outset.33
Secondly, the Operation Flood cooperatives were subject to extensive government
involvement. From the beginning, Operation Flood leaders opted for a top-down
approach to replication. In the absence of sufficient Anand-like societies in the
targeted areas, national leaders resorted to working through state governments,
wrongly anticipating that these governments would withdraw after the infrastructure
was established. State governments were heavily involved in creation, development,
and management of the cooperative infrastructure. Government involvement may
have been necessary at the beginning, but most observers argue that continued
political involvement in cooperative management has impeded their functioning. In
Andhra Pradesh and Orissa, as in most other states, state officials appoint the
managing director of the state federation; informants indicated that district and
village cooperative posts were sometimes appointed or politicized as well. This
practice creates problems of skill—the appointed managing director is often a member
of the Indian Administrative Service, a generalist without experience in running a
dairy business—and accountability—the managing director is accountable to the state
rather than the dairy farmers. In effect, cooperative positions have become a vehicle
for political patronage. As a consequence, some village societies are inactive and
many district unions and state federations operate at a loss. One report estimated
that 70 percent of district milk unions were operating at a loss in 1998 (Government of
India. Planning Commission 2002). In the past 5 years, Orissa dairy cooperatives have
sometimes resorted to milk holidays; the current state federation managing director,
Mr. Hrushikesh Panda has prohibited the practice.34 Milk holidays directly affect
producers’ income and provide a strong indicator of poor performance.35 These
problems make dairy farming less profitable for producers, but have little impact on
government-appointed directors. In the past, cooperatives have secured state subsidy
to cover their losses.
These failings help explain why the formal sector continues to comprise only a small
share of the total milk market. Researchers estimate that 88 percent of marketed
milk is sold on the informal market, often through traders (Sharma and Sharma 2002).
Cooperatives comprise the overwhelming majority of milk marketed in the formal
29

Of course, there is wide variation in performance. Some Operation Flood societies have performed
reasonably well.
30
There are some private dairy companies (e.g. Nestle) that have long had a presence in India.
31
Dairy food aid is highly controversial. Canalizing food aid avoided price shocks due to dumping, but it may
have allowed a greater amount of foreign dairy products to enter India. (Doornbos et al. 1990).
32
Since the end of Operation Flood III in 1996, the Government of India and the European Union have continued
to provide financial assistance to dairy cooperatives through NDDB, but the magnitude of assistance is smaller.
33
The original Kaira district cooperative eventually was able to obtain some support and preferential
treatment from the Government of Bombay (Alderman, Mergos, and Slade 1987).
34
A milk holiday is a day on which cooperatives will not collect milk.
35

Well-run cooperatives should have sufficient capacity to chill and process all the fresh milk they receive.
This milk may be marketed fresh or made into a variety of milk products. AMUL products include ice cream,
pizza, and processed cheese; Amul has 27 percent of the Indian ice cream market (Sharma and Sharma 2002).
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sector; in 1995, the private sector accounted for only 13 percent of total fluid milk
volume. The formal sector procures roughly 19 percent of total milk in Andhra
Pradesh (Government of Andhra Pradesh). The Orissa State Cooperative Milk
Producers’ Federation (OMFED) has a strong presence in 14 of the 31 districts
(Pradhan, Ahuja, and Venkatramaiah 2003).36 In those areas, it procures 15-17
percent of total milk. Most other districts rely on collection by the Fisheries and
Animal Husbandry Department;37 OMFED is seeking to increase its presence throughout
the state. In total, Orissa’s formal sector accounts for less than 10 percent of total
milk or 20 percent of marketed milk.38 Cooperative dominance over the formal dairy
market is thus less impressive than it seems.
The dairy sector is highly organized at the national, state, and local level. At the
national level, the National Dairy Development Board (NDDB) and the Gujarat
Cooperative Milk Marketing Federation (GCMMF) are most influential.39 NDDB, led by
Dr. Amrita Patel, has substantial assets, expertise, and connections to national
policymakers as well as dairy cooperatives. GCMMF’s influence stems from its position
as originator of the Anand model, its continued success, and the involvement of Dr.
Kurien,40 a leader in the cooperative movement. Both organizations are linked to
government, but they have substantial autonomy. The state dairy federations and
district unions are closely tied to government, as described above, and enjoy much
less independence. It cannot be assumed that most dairy cooperatives represent the
interests of their members.

State service provision: Animal health and breeding
For most of the post-Independence period, provision of veterinary and breeding
services was seen as a state responsibility. Andhra Pradesh and Orissa invested
considerable resources in developing the human and material infrastructure to provide
free veterinary and breeding services. Veterinary services were provided through a
system of veterinary hospitals, clinics, and centres staffed by veterinarians and
paraveterinarians.41 Andhra Pradesh had 285 veterinary hospitals, 1,808 dispensaries,
and 2,889 centres in March 1999; Orissa had 13 hospitals, 527 dispensaries, and 2,937
centres (Government of India. Ministry of Agriculture. Department of Animal
Husbandry & Dairying 2003). Animal health services and medicines provided during
operating hours were supposed to be free.
Recent research has shown that this system of nominally free services is quite costly
to producers (Ahuja et al. 2000; Ahuja, Morrenhof, and Sen 2002). Producers pay
government practitioners for animal care, absorb considerable transportation costs,
and must purchase medicines as free supplies are inadequate or on sale. Additionally,
while the reach of government services is considerable, many producers may be too

36

17 districts are now incorporated into the OMFED structure. Of functional societies in these districts, about
87 percent reported a profit in April 2003 (personal communication with OMFED).
37
Two Orissa districts that were not selected for Operation Flood—Ganjam and Gajpati—have received
substantial assistance from the bilateral Indo-Swiss Natural Resource Management Program. The milk union is
affiliated with OMFED.
38
Pradhan, Ahuja, and Venkatramaiah (2003) state that the formal sector accounts for less than 10 percent of
total milk in Orissa; half the milk is consumed by producer households.
39
Other dairy sector organizations include the National Cooperative Dairy Federation and the Indian Dairy
Association, which the IDA includes private companies.
40
Dr. Kurien worked at the Anand cooperatives and led NDDB throughout Operation Floods I & II. He has
retired from leadership of NDDB.
41

Paraveterinarians in state employ usually have received substantial training—1 year in Orissa—and some form
of certification; the names for these paraveterinarians vary from state to state. Most other paraveterinarians—
such as community animal health workers and Ghopal Mitras— have less training.

17

Section II: Sectoral overview

far from providers to have access to state-subsidized care.42 Orissa’s animal health
infrastructure is heavily concentrated in the relatively wealthy coastal districts
(Ahuja, Morrenhof, and Sen 2002). Although there is roughly one veterinary centre
per 45 square kilometres, the area covered by each centre ranged from 16 square
kilometres in one coastal district to 125 square kilometres in 2 interior districts.
Similar regional disparities may be evident in other states.
The central and state governments also developed a network of animal breeding
facilities, including livestock breeding farms, frozen semen stations, liquid nitrogen
plants, and semen banks. For example, Andhra Pradesh had 3,799 stationary artificial
insemination centres, 4 frozen semen stations, 9 liquid nitrogen plants, 3 liquid
nitrogen tankers, and 3 breeding farms for bulls (Andhra Pradesh Livestock
Development Agency). These facilities were meant to provide the materials for
genetic upgrading of local animals through frozen semen or bulls. Genetic material
for desired breeds was also purchased from other states and abroad.
The effort to upgrade Indian livestock arises from the perceived low productivity of
existing stock. The milk yield of Indian bovines is extremely low by international
standards. The livestock population in Andhra Pradesh and Orissa, as in much of the
country, is mostly comprised of “nondescript” 43 animals that do not belong to a
recognized breed, that produce a relatively small quantity of milk. On average,
Indian cows yield 877 kilograms of milk per year while the world average is 2,026
(Sharma and Sharma 2002). Exotic or cross-bred animals are believed to have higher
production potential. At present, the milk yield from crossbred cows exceeds that
from local cows in each state. However, most improvement efforts have met with
little success. The evidence shows that the proportion of crossbred cattle, buffalo,
and sheep remains very low despite four decades of breeding initiatives. Although the
recent population growth of crossbred milch cattle has outpaced that of desi milch
cattle, crossbreeds comprise just more than 10 percent of milch cattle and about 6
percent of all milch bovines in India (based on Ahuja et al 2000: Annexure Table 2.3);
government crossbreeding efforts began in 1962 (GOI-NLP 1996).
Three factors provide a sufficient explanation for the failure of these efforts. First,
breed improvement interventions have suffered from serious supply and quality
problems. The artificial insemination program encompasses only 15 percent of the
breedable population (Ahuja et al. 2000); government and cooperative programs have
not provided universal coverage. Of those covered the National Livestock Policy
Steering Group (1996) estimates that less than 20 percent of artificial inseminations
result in conception. The Andhra Pradesh Livestock Development Agency reports an
artificial insemination conception rate of 38.5 percent; 27.9 percent of artificial
inseminations produced live calves. This quantity and quality of service is unlikely to
change the livestock population.
Second, the level of demand for crossbred animals is unclear. The productivity of
exotic and cross bred animals is more dependent on the inputs (feed, fodder, water,
health services) received than that of desi (local) stock (Doornbos and Gertsch 2000).
Because most Indian producers are not providing the necessary quantity and quality of
inputs (see Mittal et al. 1999), the relative performance of crossbred and desi
livestock given actual inputs is a crucial issue.44 Several informants indicated that the
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Information on access to animal health services is limited. Ahuja et al’s 2000 study found that more than 90
percent of surveyed households in Kerala and Gujarat indicated they had access to health services while only
63 did so in Rajasthan. More than 95 percent of respondents from 5 districts in Orissa also reported access;
however, the survey did not include the districts with the lowest density of veterinary centres (Ahuja,
Morrenhof, and Sen 2002).
43
It is not clear whether this appellation is accurate; it is likely that many “nondescript” animals are local
breeds (Ramdas).
44
Accurate assessment of the performance of desi and crossbred animals in India would require a great deal of
data, including input data, producer characteristics, morbidity and mortality rates, time to productivity,
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performance of crossbred animals was often inferior. If it is the case that
crossbreed’s actual or perceived performance is inferior, then poor producers would
have little incentive to purchase or retain “improved” animals. Demand for crossbred
animals would then be low. Informants linked poor performance to the inputs
provided. One informant stated that crossbred cows that failed to receive the proper
diet often failed to go into oestrus. Such animals provide no benefit to poor
producers and may impose a loss. For that reason, the informant argued that artificial
insemination was inappropriate for people with insufficient resources to care for
themselves; such people should not be asked to divert scarce resources to animals. It
follows that breeding programs focused on high-input animals are likely to have a
regressive impact, imposing costs on the poor and providing benefits to those with
resources. Some informants argued that credit programs that required producers to
purchase “improved” animals have left the poor indebted. However, breeding
programs linked with interventions that increase producers’ ability to provide inputs
could have equitable or progressive (pro-poor) effects.
Third, as mentioned, cow slaughter politics constrain breed improvement. Some
experts believe that cattle breed improvement initiatives—the major focus—are
unlikely to succeed when producers cannot easily cull unproductive animals. Because
breeding initiatives have been more successful in Kerala, a state with good artificial
insemination coverage (Ahuja et al. 2000) and the fewest barriers to slaughter and
beef consumption, they argue that the anti-slaughter policies are the problem.
However, Kerala differs from Andhra Pradesh and Orissa in many other ways as well.
Without further analysis, it should not be inferred that slaughter policy change would
be sufficient to produce the desired changes in the livestock population. In any case,
change in slaughter policy is not politically feasible.
State involvement in provision of veterinary services and breeding has created a
sizeable infrastructure. The 1996 Livestock Sector Review estimated that about
22,500 veterinarians and 45,000 paraveterinarians were in state or Union Territory
government employ in 1989. About 90 percent of veterinary graduates worked for the
government. The structure of animal husbandry departments is much like that of
other Indian government agencies. A political appointee—Minister of State Droupadi
Murmu in Orissa—oversees the animal husbandry portfolio. Animal husbandry is not a
high profile area and thus ambitious politicians would not seek this post. One
informant indicated that animal husbandry sometimes has been used as a punishment
post. Ministers are attuned to the political implications of departmental activities but
often have little interest in managerial and policy details.
The top animal husbandry departmental civil servant, the Secretary, is usually an
Indian Administrative Services (IAS) or State Administrative Service officer who reports
to the Chief Secretary. The Administrative Services are a lasting legacy of British
colonial rule. Individuals enter the Services at the beginning of their career through
an extremely competitive process. Officers remain with the IAS throughout their
public career, but are posted to different positions as needed. Transfers between
departments and parastatal posts occur fairly frequently. IAS officers are generalists
who preside over a staff overwhelmingly comprised of technically expert veterinarians
and paraveterinarians.
These civil servants are promoted from within the
department. Appointments to the highest posts (e.g. Director, Joint Director) often
occur at the end of one’s career and thus tenure tends to be short—often less than 2
years and sometimes as little as two months. Most technical staff begin their careers
as field veterinarians or inspectors, circulating among posts before moving, in some
cases, to non-service work in the department. Promotion for veterinarians and
paraveterinarians is largely dependent on seniority; paraveterinarians have very little
career mobility. For both, there is often a long period in between promotions and the
salary hikes that follow. However, ambitious providers may seek more desirable,
productivity level, and duration of productive period. Figures based on the population of animals in milk, such
as Ahuja, Morrenhoff and Sen (2002), do not provide a means for comparing the full populations.
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prestigious, and profitable posts. One would expect greater competition for posts in
the wealthier coastal regions than in the remote forests. The coastal areas have a
greater concentration of veterinary and paraveterinary posts. It is possible that an
informal market for posts allows purchase of some positions (Wade 1985).
Government efforts to provide free animal husbandry and breeding services has
benefited the veterinarians and paraveterinarians in its employ. State employ has
offered reasonable salaries, security, some infrastructure, and substantial opportunity
for private gain through charges for services. Oversight and accountability to
producers has been quite limited. Any alteration in conditions of service that
increases expectations and accountability or diminishes security would encounter
resistance from those with vested interests in this system. Because IAS officers are
generalists whose careers advance (or retreat) through transfers among departments,
Secretaries are less likely to have bested interests in the departmental status quo.
This issue is discussed further in subsequent sections.

Meat production
The animals most frequently raised for meat in Andhra Pradesh and Orissa are poultry,
goats, and sheep. The state has engaged in much less sector-specific activity in the
meat sector than in dairy. On occasion, the central government has funded breeding
projects or animal purchase.45 Central and state governments have passed laws
regulating abattoirs,46 but these laws appear to be poorly enforced. Meat animal
producers thus operate in a mostly unstructured market environment.
State neglect has produced divergent outcomes. Small producers in Andhra Pradesh
and Orissa have focused on the local markets with little involvement in the commodity
chain linking the animals they rear to larger markets.47 The level of organization by or
on behalf of these producers is limited, but Andhra Pradesh appears to be much more
active than Orissa. In Andhra Pradesh there are sheep and goat rearers’ associations
with some presence at the village, district, and state level. At least one of these
associations has links to members of the state legislature, and thus some capacity to
have its concerns raised. Some rearers’ associations regularly engage in political
protest, using direct action tactics—such as bringing their sheep to fill the offices of
targeted officials—to garner attention and response. The greater level of organization
may have its source in sustained rural organizing by leftist and radical activists during
the last several decades, the presence of NGOs willing and able to serve as
institutional hosts (Houtzager 1998, 2001), and recent direct threats to these
producers’ livelihoods (see following section). The existence of multiple associations
in Andhra Pradesh likely reflects ideological and social divisions among activists.
However, informants indicated that these associations worked together on occasion.
Orissa informants made no mention of sheep or goat rearers’ associations, and the
facilitating factors above do not appear to be present in Orissa. NGOs that work with
poor livestock producers in Orissa appear to be less oriented toward political protest
and mobilization. Section IV discusses the potential for producer-based organizations
further.
The intensive poultry production sector—which comprises a substantial share of the
market for eggs and broiler meat—is highly organized. Producers have developed
close linkages to those producing necessary inputs such as feed and vaccines. These
networks of affiliated organizations (such as National Egg Coordinating Council)

45

A sheep breeding farm was established during the Fourth Five Year Plan. Animal purchase has been funded
through welfare initiatives for women, Scheduled Castes, and Scheduled Tribes.
46
The Central Government had a project that provided financial assistance for improvement of slaughter
houses and carcass utilization centres, but that project is being discontinued. Andhra Pradesh received Rs. 63
lakhs.
47
There is some work on market linkages in Rajasthan (Agrawal 1999; Robbins 1999)
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appear to be focused on market concerns, such as sharing egg price information. The
Government of India and the state governments did not play a major role in the
“poultry revolution,” but state interventions may influence the subsequent
development of commercial poultry. Informants indicated that OPOLFED, the Orissa
state poultry federation, was inactive. It seems, there is little potential for pro-poor
interventions in this area with the exception of animal health services. Since
mortality rates among backyard poultry are high, improvements in animal health
services are likely to benefit poor producers. (See Mehta et al (2002) for further
discussion of intensive poultry.)
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This section begins with discussion of three broad changes in the policy environment—
liberalization, forest management, and decentralization. Each shift has significant
implications for the livestock sector in the near and medium-term. The discussion
then turns to sector-specific reform attempts at the national and state level. These
include the national livestock policy process, the Livestock Sector Policy in Orissa, and
Vision 2020 in Andhra Pradesh

Liberalization & the dairy market
In 1991, the Indian government embarked upon a process of liberalization, which has
involved trade policy reform, market reform, and privatization.48 The commitment to
reform has been maintained through three governments—Congress Party (1991-96),
United Front (1996-1998), and National Democratic Alliance (1998-).49 Liberalization
has significant implications for the dairy industry—the only part of the livestock sector
subject to substantial protection and regulation. The Government of India signed the
Uruguay Round Agreement of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in
April 1994 and joined the World Trade Organization (WTO). To comply with GATT and
WTO, India has reduced its tariffs, removed restrictions on dairy imports, and ended
the canalization of dairy imports through the National Dairy Development Board
(NDDB). The Government of India has continued to monitor imports of milk, milk
products, and other livestock products.50
The Government of India’s liberalization process included the opening of the formal
dairy market to private (non-cooperative) actors. The diary industry was formally
delicensed in 1991. In principle, delicensing has allowed private for profit companies
to enter the dairy sector in large numbers, removing the effective cooperative
monopoly over the formal sector. In practice, liberalization was more limited. After
formal delicensing, the Government of India issued the Milk and Milk Products Order
(MMPO) in 1992. The MMPO raised barriers to entry by requiring that new entrants
procure milk from new “milksheds.”51 This provision shielded the cooperatives from
competition for milk supply, limiting producers’ alternatives. Competition for the
consumer milk market clearly increased, but in many cases, the new milkshed areas
were less attractive or uneconomic. Cooperatives continued to dominate the formal
milk market. The milkshed concept was eliminated with the amendment of the MMPO
in 2001 and 2003; private companies may now purchase milk from areas where
cooperatives are present. These changes increase the potential for formal sector
competition for producers’ milk.
Although the registration and quality regulations in the MMPO were retained—all milk
marketers are supposed to produce safe and clean milk products—enforcement
appears weak. The cooperative sector has invested substantial resources in creating a
hygienic system, while informal traders have generally failed to address safety issues.
In the past, ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ has served as a reasonable proxy for low and high
quality milk, and consumers have been able to choose the quality which they prefer,
paying a premium for formal sector milk. Some informants (and Candler (1998)) argue
that this system is breaking down. They allege that many private dairies have relied
upon purchase of milk from traders and have failed to create hygienic milk processing
48

The reasons for this reform are beyond the scope of this report (but see Pedersen 2000).
The Bharatiya Janata Party is the largest party within this alliance.
50
GATT and WTO also require reduction in agricultural and livestock subsidies. Indian livestock sector
subsidies are not substantial—in most areas there were none—and thus little change was required. See Sharma
and co-authors (2002a, 2002b, 2003) for extended discussion of dairy trade issues.
51
The MMPO also required large-scale dairy operations to register. All dairy operations are subject to product
safety and hygiene regulations. These have not been lifted.
49
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systems. These practices would enable dairies to charge less for their milk. If such
practices are widespread, and consumers continue to assume that formal sector milk
is clean, then cooperative producers may become less competitive.
As the state has opened the dairy sector to private actors, it has also adopted policy
measures that may increase their ability to compete. As was discussed, many diary
cooperatives have been subject to substantial government control and intervention.
Recent reforms in cooperative law have created space for cooperatives to restructure
and increase their autonomy. These laws include the national Amendment to the
Companies Act (2003), the Mutually Aided Cooperative Societies Act of Andhra Pradesh
(MACs, 1995), and the Orissa Self Help Cooperatives Act (2001); there are similar laws
in at least seven other states. For cooperatives registered under these new laws,
government officials would have no role in decision making. Instead, societies would
be solely accountable to their members. This would allow societies, unions, and
federations to ‘hire and fire’ their management.
Although cooperative advocates have succeeded in changing some laws,52 the struggle
to reduce government involvement continues. At present there are substantial
barriers to re-registration for existing cooperatives. Some states, such as Orissa, have
been slow to implement the new laws. In others, cooperatives must secure the
consent of a government registrar to re-register. Registrars enjoyed substantial
influence over cooperatives under the old laws; securing consent is not always
possible.
Additionally, dairy cooperatives frequently face disputes regarding
ownership of existing infrastructure. The state-controlled federation may seek to
retain or claim restitution for property secured under its aegis (usually through central
government or NDDB programs). These issues have not been fully resolved in Andhra
Pradesh, but 3,033 dairy societies had registered under the MACs law as of 31 March
2003 (Cooperative Development Foundation, personal communication).
This shift in cooperative law increases the potential for well-performing,
professionally managed cooperatives to develop but does not guarantee this outcome.
Cooperatives that choose to re-register face increased risk of failure; state
governments are unlikely to subsidize autonomous cooperatives. Many autonomous
cooperatives would seek to hire people with technical expertise in dairy management
and marketing; it is likely that other “autonomous” cooperatives would be captured
by local elites or be consumed by local conflicts and thus would continue to perform
below potential.53 In cases where societies are uneconomic or poorly managed,
removal of subsidy may lead to closure. It follows that a voluntaristic re-registration
process may lead to creaming—the disproportionate exit of high potential
cooperatives.54 Removing state involvement is costly and possibly conflictual. Reregistration would be most attractive to cooperatives that are relatively successful
and confident of their ability to compete without subsidy. Marginally successful
societies and unions are more likely to remain within the state structure, and thus to
lessen its sustainability.
The most influential national dairy organizations do not agree on the appropriate
response to the new environment. NDDB has acknowledged that many cooperatives
are not performing well and argues that improved marketing and reduced political
interference is the best approach (Patel 2003). NDDB has developed a joint venture
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The Cooperative Development Foundation of Andhra Pradesh and the National Dairy Development Board have
lobbied for changes in cooperative law.
53
Some observers of the dairy sector argue that the dominance of the Patidar / Patel caste played an
important role in the success of the Gujarat cooperatives (Alderman Mergos and Slade 1987; also see Doornbos
and Gertsch 2000). Other cooperatives may be riven by intercaste conflicts.
54
One informant argued that the exit of successful dairy cooperatives from the state-controlled Andhra
Pradesh federation has undermined the federation’s financial health.
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model for providing federations with marketing expertise.55 The Matha Federation of
Andhra Pradesh has become part of an NDDB joint venture. Ultimately, these joint
ventures are to be converted to “producer companies”, that is member-based
cooperatives operating under the Company Law. The other major player, Gujarat
Cooperative Milk Marketing Federation argues that the joint venture approach is a
threat to cooperatives:
The key risk in the joint venture model is that it will dismantle the
existing marketing federations all over the country. If the joint venture
fails, then there will be no organization or skill left in the farmers’
organizations to fall back on for the marketing function (GCMMF 2003).

The chairs of NDDB and GCMMF are pressing state federations and district unions to
take sides in this debate. NDDB is seeking joint venture agreements and GCMMF is
lobbying against them. Several informants expressed concern regarding the effect of
this argument on cooperatives. “When elephants fight, the grass suffers.”
Cooperatives maintained their dominance over the formal sector in the first decade of
liberalization, but it is not clear how well they will compete in a fully open market
that includes informal traders, private companies, and cooperatives from other
states.56 Some dairy cooperatives, such as GCMMF (Gujarat) and Vishaka (of Andhra
Pradesh), are clearly doing well; others seem less equipped to compete.

Grazing on common & state property: New restrictions
The majority of Indian livestock forage for fodder in post-harvest fields, common
lands, and forests; purchased feed and dedicated fodder crops comprise only a small
share of animal diets. Historically, resource use often was constrained by local
institutions—formal and informal rules governing how producers, farmers, and others
used the commons; these institutions appear to have declined. Even when local
institutions control resource use, however, local organizations frequently lack formal
ownership of the commons. Many common lands and most of the forests are owned
and controlled by state or national government. The state has residual ownership
over “wastelands” and village commons and has formal title to many forests. Changes
in conditions, management, and access policy affect many livestock producers.
Conditions of common lands and forests have been declining for several decades, and
policymakers have frequently blamed small ruminants for poor conditions.57
Since the 1980s, forest ministries in particular have sought to reduce the presence of
livestock in the forests. The 1988 National Forest Policy sought to balance the needs
of forest-dependent people and conservation. It recommended fodder development
projects and provision of forest produce—including fodder—“through conveniently
located depots at reasonable prices.” The policy also stated that the needs of tribals,
scheduled castes, and other poor people were to be given consideration. However,
departmental assessments of carrying capacity rather than people’s needs would
55

An NDDB subsidiary would hold majority (51%) equity in the joint ventures, and thus could exercise control
over the venture. NDDB argues this is necessary to counteract political interference by state governments.
56
Although dairy cooperatives have not begun to compete against each other for milk procurement, they are
competing for market share. Cooperatives are marketing milk outside their customary destination markets.
Amul markets a wide range of products (ice cream, pizza) throughout India and internationally. Andhra
Pradesh cooperatives are marketing milk in Orissa.
57
The Hanumantha Rao Commission (1987) evaluated the impact of sheep and goats on fragile ecological zones
and concluded that small ruminants did not pose an ecological threat. Many researchers argue that forest
management policies, insufficient staffing, corruption, and local ingenuity are at least equally important.
Historically, the forest department has found it difficult to monitor and control forest extraction (Agrawal and
Ostrom 2001).
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determine the area to which those living near the forest would receive access.
Subsequent policies continued in this vein.
The Forest Department of Andhra Pradesh has been particularly aggressive in its
efforts to reduce forest extraction. In 2001, the Department issued a notice of a draft
policy that would dramatically reduce grazing in the forest. One category of forests,
“interior protection forests,” was to be entirely closed to grazing. Other, “open
forests”, were to be closed for four months each year. The policy also restricted
grazing to a certain number of “cow units,”58 granted villages adjacent to forests
preference, and introduced grazing fees for the first time since 1968. Goats were to
be allowed into the forest only in the company of sheep, with a maximum of 4 per
group of 100 or more sheep.
The proposed policy would clearly have had adverse impacts on poor livestock
producers—the department estimated that 50 percent of cattle frequent the forest
and acknowledged that most goats and sheep graze on common land. The sheep and
goat rearers’ associations and their NGO allies quickly mobilized in response.59
Anthra, an Indian NGO, coordinated the response to the draft policy. Started by
women veterinary scientists in the 1990s, Anthra works with poor people in rural areas
on livestock issues.60 Anthra has established networks of livestock rearers, animal
health workers, and traditional healers; it also works closely with other NGOs on rural
issues, women, and adivasis. The proposed policy was discussed at a forum on fodder
and grazing issues.
The participants were livestock rearers, NGO staff, and
representatives of people’s organizations; senior government officials were invited but
did not attend. Subsequently, sheep and goat rearers convened at a state-wide
meeting, discussions were held in several districts, and a critique of the logic behind
the policy—particularly the focus on goats—was issued (Fodder and Grazing Forum
n.d.). Individuals also used connections with elected officials and civil servants to
ensure that the issue was raised; official correspondence between the Principal
Secretaries of Animal Husbandry and Forestry then ensued. This mobilization led to
the withdrawal of the policy and the formation of a committee to examine the issue.
Committee membership was initially comprised solely of senior government officials
from each department and Dr. Sagari Ramdas (director of Anthra) as a representative
of the Grazing and Fodder Forum of Andhra Pradesh; later it was revised to include
representatives from the sheep and goat rearer and adivasi communities. The current
Forest Department grazing policy is “to have no policy.” While this incident
demonstrates the ability of Andhra Pradesh livestock producers and their advocates to
organize in defence of their interests, it also shows their vulnerability and relative
marginality—it is unlikely the Forest Department would have issued a policy ending
commercial timber extraction without prior notice and consultation with the industry.
The new committee may serve as a means for producers to engage pro-actively with
the Forest and Animal Husbandry departments. This issue is discussed further in
Section IV.

New management strategies: Decentralization & user groups
The third broad shift in the policy environment is decentralization. Two recent
constitutional amendments have provided local governments—the Panchayati Raj

58

Anthra argues that the cow unit equivalences have little scientific validity for they do not reflect established
standards regarding the relative impact of different livestock-cows, buffaloes, goats, and sheep.
59
This discussion is based on Anthra (2002) and the author’s interviews with participants and observers of this
process.
60
Anthra, an NGO based in Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra, describes itself as “an alternative resource
training and advocacy centre for bio-diversity based livestock production in the wider context of people’s
livelihoods” (Organizational brochure). The organization trained about 300 animal health workers between
1994 and 2002. Anthra receives support from international donors and also raises funds by charging for
workshops, trainings, and consultations provided to other organizations.
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institutions (PRIs)—with substantial formal authority over policy, including natural
resource management. To date, the PRIs have not garnered sufficient control over
financial resources in Andhra Pradesh, Orissa, or most other states to have substantial
authority. If the PRIs manage to secure actual control over constitutionally allocated
powers, however, these institutions will control access to common lands, water, and
forests. As with the forest policies above, PRI access policies will affect livestock
producers’ livelihoods.
The actual impact of decentralization, should it occur, is unclear. Some believe that
PRIs have the potential to increase local democracy and accountability—most positions
are elected and places are reserved for traditionally underrepresented groups such as
women, dalits and adivasis. Others look to the Gram Sabha—the collective of all
voters—for democratic, equitable decisions. But others contend these institutions
could provide a new mechanism for clientelism. Individuals appointed to posts
reserved for underrepresented groups may be accountable to their appointers rather
than the group they ostensibly represent. All local organizations are vulnerable to
elite capture. Capture of the Panchayati Raj institutions would become more
desirable if they garner control over important resources. In the absence of concerted
efforts to create institutional safeguards for pro-poor PRIs, the effect of
decentralization on poor livestock producers is likely to vary from place to place
depending upon the social composition of the area and the degree to which producers
organize on behalf of their interests.
Although full decentralization to the Panchayati Raj institutions has not yet occurred,
central and state government resource management strategies have shifted towards
greater local involvement. While renewing efforts to conserve the forests (as
described above), Forest Department officials have sought to enlist communities in
forest monitoring and protection through Joint Forest Management, now called
Community Forest Management.61 This shift towards local user groups is evident in
watersheds and irrigation management as well (Mosse 1997, 1998).
Local
participation initiatives have generally involved the creation of user groups that are
granted some authority over nearby areas and given limited rights to extract resources
in exchange for monitoring and enforcement of access rules. In some places, these
local user groups have provided monitoring and enforcement where there was little
before (Agrawal 2001). The extent of local control of user groups is unclear. Officials
enjoy substantial discretion in determining which areas are suitable to community
management and in approving access rules, but some user groups may have
substantial authority.
Improvements in forest condition from lessened resource extraction potentially have
broad benefits, and motivated user groups—or policy makers—probably could design
equitable policies. However, researchers have found that many of the costs have
been imposed on the poorer segments of communities—including livestock producers—
while local elites have captured the benefits (eg, Ramdas n.d.).62 Agrawal (2001)
argues, “Allocation rules, even when they are seemingly equitable, produce outcomes
that are systematically biased against those who are marginal and less powerful.”
Restrictive livestock access rules, for example, hurt the poor disproportionately, for
they are most dependent on common areas and least able to pay fines or bribes. If
officials and user groups continue to restrict livestock grazing without compensation,
the ability of poor producers to maintain their livestock will decline. In some cases,
Forestry officials have encouraged producers to sell their goats (Rao 2001). Research
on community watershed management indicates that these concerns are valid there as
well (Kerr 2002).

61

See the following for extensive discussion of these initiatives (Poffenberger and McGean 1996; Khare et al.
2000; Sundar 2000).
62
Although less research is available on these committees, many are comprised mostly of individuals who own
land next to water.
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In Andhra Pradesh, Chief Minister Naidu has used the Janmabhoomi Programme and
user/self-help group to circumvent the Panchayati Raj institutions (Manor 2000; Powis
2003). The PRIs in Andhra Pradesh are highly politicized and party competition for the
gram panchayats is the norm.63 Although Naidu’s Telegu Desam Party (TDP) is
dominant, other parties have been able to secure representation in the gram
panchayats and thus the TDP cannot fully control PRI activities. The state government
has not devolved substantial powers to the PRIs; the elected sarpanch continues to
control most local government resources. As an alternative to the PRIs, Naidu has
created the Janmabhoomi Programme and encouraged the creation of user groups for
watershed management, forest management, irrigation and other areas.
Janmabhoomi is a “people-centred participatory development process” through which
villagers are supposed to express their needs through the Gram Sabha, identify
solutions, and then mobilize to implement them.64 The Janmabhoomi—community
mobilization—takes place about every three months. Informants indicated that the
“people-centred” Janmabhoomi is highly politicized and tightly controlled by local
bureaucrats; there is little evidence that local communities are driving this process
(Powis 2003). Janmabhoomi may serve as a mechanism for service and resource
delivery, but it has not empowered the local PRIs. Some also contend that the many
user groups in Andhra Pradesh have been politicized and serve as a vehicle for
political patronage.

National livestock sector policy process
During the early 1990s, the Government of India undertook a comprehensive review of
the livestock sector with the aim of developing a new policy framework; the
Government of Switzerland collaborated in this project.65 A Steering Committee was
established in 1993, and consultants drafted papers on a wide range of issues; the
World Bank also commissioned studies on related topics. These papers, a synthesis
report, and perspective papers, were shared at two national workshops and revised in
response to comments.
These workshops sought to engage all the relevant
stakeholders66, but there appears to have been little organized participation by
farmers or livestock producers. Of the more than eighty participants listed, only two
participants were listed as farmers.
The informants felt that governments,
cooperatives, and service providers/NGOs were most influential. Finally, the 1996
National Livestock Policy Perspective Report proposed a new livestock policy
framework. Although leaders hoped that this process would lead to a national
livestock policy, little visible progress towards a national policy has been made to
date.67 The reasons for the failure of this national policy effort are unclear.
The livestock policy process succeeded in influencing state and national policy
debates; the perspective presented in the Report and some of the specific
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The degree of party politicization of the PRIs in Andhra Pradesh may be exceptional (Powis 2003).

64

Janmabhoomi was launched in 1997. The core areas are community works, primary education, primary
health
and
family
welfare,
environmental
conservation,
and
responsive
government.
(http://www.aponline.gov.in/quicklinks/programmes/janmabhoomi/janmabhoomi.html).
Several
Janmabhoomis have included “free” veterinary camps. Informants indicated that a substantial proportion of
veterinary camp vaccines and medicines were sold.
65
As is discussed elsewhere, the Swiss have been involved in the Indian livestock sector for more than 40 years.
The Swiss Agency for International Development (SIDA), Intercooperation, and state-based bilateral agencies
(Indo-Swiss projects) are the primary agents.
66
Participants included state and national civil servants, NGO and INGO staff, consultants, researchers, dairy
cooperative leaders, corporation leaders, industry association leaders and farmers (GOI-NLP). Informants
indicated that environmentalists and animal rights/welfare interests were also represented.
67
The Government of India has approved an Agriculture Policy, which makes brief mention of livestock. The
chapter on animal husbandry and dairying in the 10th Five Year Plan (2002-2007) is only the policy statement.
(National livestock sector policy is subject to periodic review as part of the preparation process for each fiveyear plan.)
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recommendations have been adopted. For example, the Report argued the existing
breeding infrastructure was ineffective and inefficient. It proposed the transfer of
this infrastructure to state livestock development boards and service delivery to
private practitioners. The National Project on Cattle and Buffalo Breeding adopts this
approach.

Orissa livestock sector policy
The Orissa livestock sector policy process was modelled after the national process and
involved many of the same actors.68 The state established a steering committee in
1998, the committee undertook a broad review of the livestock sector (Kurup 2003),
using consultants to synthesize available research and collect original data when
necessary, findings were presented to stakeholders in a series of workshops, and
recommendations were drafted. Throughout this process, staff at the Indo-Swiss
Natural Resource Management Program-Orissa (ISNRMPO) worked closely with officials
at the Department of Fisheries and Animal Resources Development (FARD), both line
staff in the Directorate of Animal Husbandry and Veterinary Services and appointees
such as the FARD Secretary and Joint Director. After the Steering Committee
completed its work, responsibility for navigating the policy adoption process shifted to
FARD. The department drafted a policy and took it through the internal consultative
process69 and secured Cabinet approval. After a hiatus partly due to the disastrous
supercyclone of 1999, the policy was approved in October 2002, subject to occasional
review by the Cabinet. The consultation process included scientists, veterinarians,
NGOs, and farmers. Most Orissa informants reported some involvement in the policy
process,70 although those who take issue with the market-focused approach adopted
do not feel their concerns were addressed. Observers and participants in this process
credit ISNRMPO—“the only stable proponent of the policy”— and the current Secretary
with securing its adoption. Neither of these actors can be relied upon to shepherd the
new policy through full implementation, for the Secretary is subject to transfer, and
the bilateral Indo-Swiss Programme is dependent on the continued good will of
government officials for its access.71
The primary reforms adopted in the Orissa Livestock Sector Policy (OLSP) are the
following: 1) the marketization72 of veterinary and artificial insemination, 2) capacitybuilding of small holders,73 3) promotion of linkages between grassroots organizations
and the animal husbandry department,74 4) re-orientation of the directorate towards
68

Dr. MPG Kurup served as a coordinating consultant for both processes, and the Swiss Government (Indo-Swiss
Natural Resource Management Program-Orissa in this case) collaborated with state government.
69
The draft was examined by the department, who sought expert opinion on some technical matters,
circulated to other departments—approval of the Finance Department was critical—and then went to Cabinet.
70
Most of the individuals interviewed were not livestock producers or farmers; it is not clear how well these
perspectives were represented in the policy process.
71

As with other Indian bilaterals, the Indo-Swiss Programme must secure consent from the Government of India
for its programme of work. If the current secretary were replaced by one hostile to their approach, ISNRMPO
could lose its privileged access to state officials and civil servants. To date, ISNRMPO has focused its
implementation support efforts on two areas: development of departmental human resources and institutions
and creation of linkages between the department and grassroots organizations.
Additionally, the priorities of ISNRMPO could change. Although the Swiss government has been involved in the
Indian livestock sector for more than forty years (Intercooperation 2000), it recently has shifted towards a
natural resources approach in which livestock comprises one part.
72
Marketization is used to describe a general shift towards subjecting health services to market forces. This
may include full privatization, but also encompasses more limited reforms such as user fees.
73
These initiatives were intended to increase productivity and reduce reliance on state services. The policy
mentions veterinary first aid, vaccination, parasite control, feed supplementing, sheltering, innovations and
candling (Section 3.1(b)).
74
“These organizations can form the organic link between the department and the small holders as well as the
conduit for transfer of technologies, skill training, extension support and even inputs.” (Section 3.1(c)).
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disease control, prevention and eradication, and livestock sector development. The
policy states that there should be “greater autonomy, greater member control and
reduced government interventions” in OMFED and its affiliates but provides no
specifics on what this would entail.
The state would promote intermediate
technologies—such as crossbred milch animals—through credit schemes and other
programs. The Policy also seeks to develop an ecologically sustainable livestock
sector and identifies the bovine population as a threat (Section 3.6). Consistent with
its prior orientation, the OLSP is relatively expansive on breed improvement issues but
provides less detail on other subsectors and issues.
Two reforms have already been implemented. The state has implemented user
charges for veterinary and breeding services; in most cases these fees are quite low.
As mentioned, most producers were already paying for services, and the fees provide
the department with discretionary funds. Orissa also has created a formally
independent agency, the Orissa Livestock Resource Development Society (OLRDS),
which will assume ownership of the breeding infrastructure. Creation of the OLRDS
made Orissa eligible for financial support from the National Project for Cattle and
Buffalo Breeding; user charges are also being routed to OLRDS. Operations and
maintenance of the breeding farms was quite costly; shifting ownership relieves the
fiscal burden on the state and may allow for closure of some facilities. As of July
2003, the state had not ceded authority over OLRDS; the transitional governing Task
Force was comprised primarily of civil servants.75
The OLSP views grassroots organizations as a potential link between the Department
and small producers, and a means for capacity building and resource transfer. There
are many NGOs that work directly with communities; the policy thus seeks to link
NGOs to state government. Over the last decade, NGOs have taken the initiative in
training community-based veterinary paraprofessionals. In most cases, the programs
were designed as follows: communities selected a few individuals to become
community animal health workers; NGOs provided these individuals with training, a
veterinarian kit, and subsidy; and then the individuals begin working in their home
village, charging fees for their service. Since the OLSP was adopted, the Indo-Swiss
program has begun an initiative to link these NGOs with the Directorate of Animal
Husbandry and Veterinary Services.
To fully implement the OLSP, more radical change is required. The state would have
to withdraw from direct service provision in most areas, encourage community-based
paraprofessional service providers, and radically increase its activity in two areas
where it has had little presence before, extension and disease control. The
government faces considerable obstacles to full implementation of these changes for
two reasons. One, they conflict with the vested interests of most departmental
employees, and two, the state lacks capacity in these new areas. As discussed, the
Directorate is comprised primarily of veterinarians and paraveterinarians who receive
a salary and benefits, are paid by users for their services, and face few sanctions for
poor performance. “A veterinarian enters Government service at around the age of
23-25 years, with an assured tenure of some 35 years in Government service until
superannuation” (GOI-NLP: Section 7.8). The changes envisioned in OLSP would
require veterinarians and livestock inspectors to fully enter the market for health
services (losing salary security), would increase the stature of community service
providers, and would require that veterinarians face increased accountability for
performance. One would expect most veterinarians to resist these changes. To date,
retired veterinarians have been the most vocal critics of the new policy.
Veterinarians’ ability to resist changes arises not from the constituency they serve—
which might benefit from change—but from the structure of the state bureaucracy.
State employees have considerable security of tenure—Orissa cannot privatize
75

Of 11 members, 7 are state officials—including the OMFED Managing Director, 2 are affiliated with ISNRMPO,
1 represents the state Veterinary College, and 1 represents NDDB.
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veterinary practice without rewriting long-established civil service rules that affect
most government employees. To do so would require expending serious political
capital and alienating most civil servants for limited rewards—it is unlikely that
livestock producers would reward reforms with political loyalty. One observer of
national reform noted that this type of civil service reform is unprecedented in India;
it is unlikely that the low profile livestock sector will lead in this area.
To lessen the resistance from veterinarians, OLSP states that the changes in veterinary
service will take place over a 25-year period. Current employees will be allowed to
become mobile practitioners in some areas but will not lose their benefits. This
strategy could provide a simpler way to transition to the desired new system, if the
state managed to avoid hiring staff with the same rights. To do so, it could leave
vacancies unfilled—a common practice—or establish different contracts for new
employees. However, the long transition period poses substantial risks that reforms
will simply grant formal recognition to the old system of state funded private
practice. While line staff and field staff will probably stay with the department until
retirement, it is highly unlikely that the top department officials—secretary,
commissioner, etc—will remain in their positions for 25 years. If their replacements
lack commitment to this reform vision, they may bring in new veterinarians under the
old rules, halting the transition.
The mismatch between present departmental capacity and the skills required by the
new approach may be easier to address. Currently, the training government
practitioners receive emphasizes curative interventions and grants prestige to large
ruminants. Staff remaining in the state’s employ would be expected to work in
extension and disease prevention. These are areas their training did not emphasize
and for which the potential for side benefits is limited—the market price for extension
is likely to be low due to its semi-public good qualities.76 At the time this research
was conducted, the incentive problem had not yet been addressed—promotions and
raises were not linked to delivery of these services. Other barriers to effective
service provision include the low prestige granted to serving poor, socially marginal
producers, and the lack of epidemiological skills required for disease surveillance and
monitoring. The state has begun to take steps to address the skill mismatch with
assistance from ISNRMPO, who are supporting the Human and Institutional
Development initiative. The central government will support efforts to control foot
and mouth disease.
The Orissa Livestock Sector Policy explicitly seeks to help the poor. It argues that
livestock can serve as “an engine for the social and economic development of the
rural population” and lists “capacitat[ing] the marginalized sections … so that they are
enabled to have equal access to the opportunities offered” as a goal (Sections 2.1,
2.4). The rationale for reforms is clear. Government veterinary and breeding service
provision has consumed most of the budget but has failed to provide free service, to
reach most/all producers, or to accomplish breed improvement. Additionally, state
services and medicines have not been targeted to the poor (Ahuja, Morrenhof, and Sen
2002).
Whether the OLSP improves the welfare of poor livestock producers as promised
depends upon the manner in which it is implemented. The principal effects of the
proposed reforms concern health and breeding services. As has been discussed, the
present system is not particularly pro-poor. Livestock producers who reside fairly
close to a veterinary clinic or hospital benefit from access to care; in some areas,
76

In economic theory, a pure public good exhibits nonexcludabiity and nonrivalry (one person’s use does not
prevent another’s). These traits create free rider problems—since those who bear the costs of provision cannot
exclude others from benefit, there is little incentive to invest. For semi-public goods, exclusion is difficult
and/or subtraction (crowding) effects occur. Willingness to pay for these goods depends on how the exclusion
and rivalry problems are addressed, as well as on the private benefits garnered by recipients of these goods.
(These factors may vary according to the disease or extension service). Obviously, the quality of services
provided would also affect demand and market price.
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NGO-trained paraveterinarians provide service. Some dairy producers also benefit
from local cooperative societies that provide alternatives to local sale or reliance on
informal traders. Both veterinary services and dairy cooperatives have a stronger
presence in the relatively wealthy coastal belt as compared to the poorer inland areas
and the forested areas in which most adivasis reside (Ahuja, Morrenhof, and Sen
2002). If the state were to increase provision of semi-public goods such as extension
and disease control and eradication equitably, this would clearly be of benefit to
small producers.
The changes that would most directly affect poor producers involve the marketization
of health services. User charges have the potential to restrict access to care—if
charges exceeded ability to pay—or they might increase access if charges were used to
improve service, service providers became more mobile, and/or providers entered
previously unserved areas. The new user charges are low compared to the prices
producers were paying previously. If the charges have not lead to a change in market
price, then the fees would have little negative impact on poor producers. Further
research into current market prices and ability to pay may be advisable.77
Department officials indicated that fee revenue, currently held in ORLDS coffers,
would be routed to service centres for improvement. Local committees would have
some say in allocation of this revenue. These measures may improve service quality.
The impact of privatization would depend on the resulting distribution of service
providers and the characteristics of the local market for service. State officials
indicated that privatization would be implemented first in high potential districts
where conditions were suitable—mostly those along the coasts—and gradually
extended elsewhere; state service might continue indefinitely in places where private
practice seems unsustainable. Since the department has adopted a strategy of
transition through attrition, however, it is not clear whether and how service will be
targeted to the poorer areas. At present, services are concentrated in the wealthier
coastal areas. Many of the poor and remote places are ill served; new posts might
need to be established. To target services to poorer areas, the department would
need to develop appropriate incentives, for one would expect veterinarians and
paraveterinarians to resist transfer to remote areas. Community animal health
workers may be willing to work in these areas, but veterinary codes require that they
restrict their activities to minor veterinary services. It is also unclear whether poor
areas possess sufficient resources to pay workers enough to sustain themselves
(Ramdas and Ghotge 2002). Intervention to extend access to services in remote areas
could have substantial pro-poor effects.
A second consideration for marketization is the likely structure of markets. Advocates
of this model argue that fees and privatization will make providers more accountable
to the producers who use this service. However, users’ ability to hold providers
accountable is limited by the level of local competition and their information
regarding service quality. If there are multiple providers, the market would allow
providers to select the quality and cost they prefer. When producers encounter a
local monopoly or oligopoly, however, they encounter the difficult decision to pay
more for inferior service or to go without—risking the loss of their animals.78
Additionally, obtaining information on service quality may be costly—poor quality
artificial insemination can result in the loss of a calving season—and may be flawed.
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Research indicates that producers are willing to pay. Ability of producers to pay clearly varies with their
wealth. To evaluate the impact of these charges, one would need answers to several questions. What are the
new market prices for veterinary and breeding services? Have the user charges simply been added to
veterinarian fees? Have they fully or partially displaced the informal charges? In practice, is ability to pay
taken into account? Are prices restricting access to services for poorer producers? Have charges increased
practitioners accountability to livestock producers as was proposed. Orissa DAH&VS officials indicated that
they have commissioned research into the impact of user fees.
78
Leonard (2000) proposes several strategies for addressing this problem.
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If marketization is implemented without attention to ability to pay, targeting, and
market structure and quality, anti-poor outcomes could result. One might get well
functioning, mobile, and competitive service provision in the wealthier coast while
the poorest areas lose all access to professional service as the remaining veterinarians
would also service the coastal areas. If the department and its partners are attentive
to these issues, however, service might well improve for all producers. The concerns
raised above could be mitigated through careful design and implementation of a
market-based animal health services model. Given the low level of mobilization by
Orissa’s livestock producers, however, other actors would need to advocate on their
behalf. This issue is discussed further in Section IV.

Andhra Pradesh’s Vision 2020
In early 1999, the government of Andhra Pradesh released Vision 2020, a broad vision
and strategy document for the next 20 years. Although several sectoral task forces
and consultant groups were involved in its creation, Vision 2020 clearly draws its
motive force from Chief Minister Chandrababu Naidu.79 Vision 2020 sets the broad
framework for state policy, establishing broad goals and concrete objectives, and
identifying several sectors that will serve as “growth engines.” These include dairy
farming, poultry, and agro-industry. The poultry and agro-industries sections focus
solely on further development of the commercial sector.
Although many of the initiatives outlined in Vision 2020 are similar to those in the
National Livestock Policy Perspective and the OLSP, Vision 2020 departs from these
policies in its emphasis on large-scale private sector involvement in the agriculture
and livestock sectors. For example, Vision 2020 strongly advocates the entry of large
private investors to commercial farming.80 Vision 2020 argues that large private
investment is essential to the development of these sectors and seeks to create an
enabling environment for investment. Several critics have taken issue with the Vision
2020 approach (Prajateerpu: a citizen's jury/scenario workshop on food and farming
futures for Andhra Pradesh, India 2001; ANTHRA; Reddy 1999); this analysis focuses
more narrowly on policy proposals in the agriculture sector that would affect poor
livestock producers.
Vision 2020 outlines three major initiatives to attract private investment:
infrastructure improvement, facilitation of economies of scale, removal of regulatory
barriers and disincentives, and targeted research and development. Infrastructure
investment includes road, port, and airport construction—to connect major rural
production centres to urban areas, for example—and improvements in rural power and
water supply as well as provision of sector-specific facilities—such as cold storage.
Improvements in rural infrastructure and market linkage are likely to benefit small
livestock producers. Better roads could improve goat and sheep producers’ access to
urban consumers and reduce the transportation costs incurred by intermediaries,
increasing the potential for profit. Increased access could diminish the already
limited market for backyard poultry if sale of intensive poultry increases in rural
areas, but this seems a reasonable trade off. More consistent power could lessen the
costs that cooperatives and private actors incur for milk chilling and processing, and
could make sanitary meat practices more feasible. Ports and airports are less likely to
directly affect poor producers as they sell mostly to local and state markets.
Vision 2020 argues that the small size of agricultural holding inhibits the growth and
development of the sector. It thus advocates measures to consolidate holdings and
increase output, including agricultural cooperatives, contract farming, and land
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CM Naidu is seen as a dynamic leader and has been credited or blamed for the tenor of the state’s reform
efforts. Andhra Pradesh is led by the Telegu Desam Party.
80
The emphasis on large investors stems from the investment required for infrastructure, distribution and
marketing.
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consolidation. Both land and livestock are distributed inequitably in Andhra Pradesh,
but livestock holdings are less inequitable. Neither cooperatives nor contract farming
would necessarily disadvantage small livestock producers; both should allow producers
to retain their land.81 Land consolidation may negatively affect small landholders—
who are usually small livestock producers as well. Registration and consolidation
processes often have a regressive impact because land is re-allocated towards social
elites and large landholders, who are best situated to defend their interests in the
process. In its discussion of land issues, Vision 2020 makes no reference to the
welfare of small holders; it thus seems unlikely that their interests would be
protected in the consolidation process. It should be noted that land consolidation
faces serious political opposition; it is perhaps the least likely of the initiatives
discussed to be implemented.
Removal of the regulatory barriers to private sector investment in agriculture or
agroindustry would affect small livestock producers to the extent that they increase
competition for livestock products or for market share.82 These effects are most likely
to be felt in the dairy sector and poultry sectors; Vision 2020 makes no proposals
regarding the non-poultry meat market. Regarding dairy, Vision 2020 recommends the
amendment of the Milk and Milk Products Order (since lifted) to reduce licensing
requirements and suggests the disallowal of procurement from existing milk sheds. If
corporations were to set up farms or develop new milk sheds, Vision 2020 argues, they
would assist in the expansion of the formal dairy sector. Vision 2020 also commits the
government to implementation of the Mutually Aided Co-operative Societies Act
(MACs) to remedy the politicization of cooperatives.
The effect of large private entry or expansion into Andhra Pradesh’s dairy sector on
small dairy producers will depend on the behaviour of these private actors. Increased
competition for milk in new or existing milk sheds is likely to benefit producers, who
may receive a better price, at least as long as both cooperatives and privates remain
in the procurement market. It is possible that private companies might not compete
for milk from small producers; instead they might target only larger producers for
collection83 or create private farms to produce their own milk. In that case,
competition for market share would increase and outcomes will depend on the ability
of cooperatives to compete and the size of the consumer market. Implementation of
the MACs law would make it more likely that at least some milk cooperatives would
compete successfully.
The targeted research and development initiatives described in Vision 2020 have the
potential to reduce the competitiveness of small livestock producers. Because these
initiatives would focus on the commercial sector and strong areas, these actors would
benefit from a subsidy smaller producers would not receive. Research suggests that
initiatives focused on large producers frequently fail to benefit small producers.
Similarly, development would focus on “historically strong” areas. For example, the
dairy initiatives are to focus on coastal Andhra Pradesh, and selected parts of
Rayalseema and Telengana; replication will be limited to areas with large pasture
lands. For the most part, these historically strong areas are relatively wealthy; poorer
areas would not be the focus of state attention.
Other sector-specific reforms outlined in Vision 2020 include the reduction of
government interference in dairy cooperatives, selective privatization of animal
health and breeding services, increased investment in public goods services, and a
feed and fodder development program. Vision 2020 argues that the animal husbandry
81

The impact of contract farming would depend on the specifics of the contract. In Andhra Pradesh, it seems
likely that contracting would focus on households with larger plots of arable land, and thus would have little
direct impact on small producers (Also see Singh 2002).
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The primary exception is the MMPO.
“Small” and “large” are relative figures; a large producer might have 4 cows. Some interviewees suggested
that this was the dominant private sector approach.
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department should privatize those private good services while continuing84 and
augmenting provision of public goods—disease eradication, extension, programmes for
weaker sections. Andhra Pradesh has already implemented user fees. It also has
created an Andhra Pradesh Livestock Development Agency for breeding services and
trained paraprofessionals (“Ghopal Mitras”) to provide fee-based breeding services.
As in Orissa, the Livestock Development Agency is operated by government officials.
No detail is provided on the public goods and feed and fodder programmes. The
feasibility and implications of these types of sector-specific reforms have already been
discussed with reference to Orissa.
Andhra Pradesh’s Vision 2020 differs from the Orissa Livestock Sector Policy in its lack
of an explicit stated commitment to protect poor livestock producers. Thus, there is
greater reason for concern that policy implementers will not consider poor producers
in their decisions. Although Andhra Pradesh livestock producers (and their allies) are
more organized and politically engaged than those in Orissa, small producers are most
likely to mobilize around issues that have a large and direct negative effect on their
livelihoods—such as grazing restrictions or land consolidation. Initial marketization
measures are likely to have little visible impact; producers are already paying for
health services. The broader re-orientation of agricultural policy toward large-scale
private actors may significantly affect small producers, but these changes (e.g. in
regulatory policy and research programs) have little direct effect and thus are unlikely
to provoke a response. Even when mobilized, small producers are likely to exert less
influence than pro-reform actors such as Chief Minister Naidu and private industries.
Interventions that work within this path are more likely to meet with success as long
as CM Naidu remains the state’s most powerful political actor.
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If private actors failed to market private good services in an area, the document states, government would
provide services “on a cost-recovery basis.”
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CONCLUSION: STRATEGIC ENTRY POINTS, ACTORS, AND
ALTERNATIVES
This paper has analyzed political and economic factors affecting poor rural livestock
producers in Andhra Pradesh and Orissa. Based on that analysis, this section considers
several strategies for enhancing the livelihoods of poor rural livestock producers.
Possible sector-wide interventions include enhancing producers’ ability to act on their
own behalf and improving producers’ access to common resources. Strategies that
focus more narrowly on animal health services, dairy, and small ruminants are also
discussed. Most strategies work within the framework of the recent reforms described
in Section III. These strategies are drawn from current policy debates and informants’
recommendations. This section begins with discussion of broad interventions and then
shifts to consider sub-sectoral initiatives for dairy and small ruminant producers.

Enhancing producers’ ability to act on their own behalf
As long as small livestock producers are not an organized and active interest group,
livestock and related sector policies will be driven by other actors who may have
conflicting interests. Thus, building the capacity of producers to act on their own
behalf is important to improving poor producers’ welfare. However, prospects for
livestock sector-based organizations are limited as long as livestock remains a
secondary occupation or livelihood for most producers. These producers are likely to
focus on protecting and enhancing their primary livelihood, mobilizing only in
response to urgent threats. Producers who garner their primary livelihood from
livestock are more likely to invest in livestock-focused organizations.
The continued presence of patron-client relations in many locales poses an additional
barrier to organization of producers in pursuit of their interests. Poorer producers are
often linked to wealthier households through obligations and favours. Influential
patrons may provide agricultural jobs, loans, or assistance in emergencies in exchange
for political loyalty when it is demanded. These patron-client ties can prevent poor
producers from mobilizing to assert their interests individually (through policy-based
voting) or collectively (in cooperatives, interest groups or social movements). Clients
also are unlikely to challenge their patrons for public office or to hold them
accountable for poor management of local organizations. Those clients who secure
Panchayati Raj offices reserved for Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes may not act
in the interest of those populations. Patron-client ties can allow the privileged to
control or monopolize the distribution of divisible goods—tractors, credit, extension
services—and to ensure that their interests prevail when there is a conflict between
their interests and those of their clients. Patron-client relations appear to be more
influential in Orissa than neighbouring Andhra Pradesh.85 Andhra Pradesh has had
sustained peasant and radical movements that mobilized segments of the rural
population, and contemporary observers describe rural Andhra Pradesh as highly
politicized (Manor 2000; Powis 2003). In contrast, Orissa is known for its “exceedingly
quiescent civil society,” and the long dominance of a narrow elite (Manor 2000).
Prospects for producer organization are also influenced by the logic of collective
action (Olson 1965). Participation in organizations imposes costs as well as providing
benefits. Decisions to lead or participate in associations are influenced by the
perceived costs/benefit ratio and prospects for success. While it should not be
assumed that participation decisions depend on an individualistic, materialist calculus
(Agrawal 2001; Ostrom 1990; Tarrow 1998; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 2000), such
factors influence the development of associations and movements. The costs and
benefits of participation vary across individuals, locales, and states. For example, the
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This assessment is based on discussions with informants and the secondary literature.
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calculus of those dependent on livestock income would differ from those for whom
livestock income is supplementary. Also, in places where livestock clients who join an
association may lose their patron this cost would vary with the benefits provided by
that patron. This cost would be insignificant in places where patron-client relations
are weak or absent.
Given this context, three strategies have reasonable prospects for long-term success.
One, external actors can support member-based dairy cooperatives and other
producer associations such as sheep and goat rearers associations when and where
they emerge, and can support poor producers involved in mixed organizations. In
places where local producers have taken steps to organize, external actors can
facilitate information sharing and organizational development across locales, thereby
reducing the cost of organization. This strategy seems broadly relevant in Andhra
Pradesh, where there are several networks of livestock producer and health service
providers. In Orissa, member organizations seem most common in the dairy sector.
Two, actors can support or seek to catalyze the development of broad-based
organizations in which small producers comprise a substantial share of membership.
Small livestock producers often share other interests (e.g. as small farmers or
agricultural labourers) and identities (e.g. as adivasis or dalits) that may be of higher
priority.86 Broad-based organizations can provide a space in which livestock producers
develop the skills to advocate on their own behalf and the base through which
producers articulate their sectoral interests.87
Three, actors can monitor and support local organizations that exert control over
important resources. As discussed, the Panchayati Raj institutions (PRIs) and user
groups have the potential to be inclusive and democratic despite evident failures.
Critical attention to local organizations increases the likelihood that poor producers
will be able to participate effectively if they choose to do so. Because the influence
of patron-client relations, the strength of PRIs and user groups, and the role of small
producers within local organizations vary substantially from place to place, efforts to
enhance producers’ capacities are likely to produce uneven outcomes.
Enhancing producers’ capacity and self-organization is an intensive and long-term
effort. Time is required to develop local knowledge and trust, and skills and
relationships. The resultant organizations, whether livestock-specific or broad-based,
are likely to become politicized—to develop controversial positions and to form
alliances with political leaders and parties. Direct interventions in this area are best
undertaken by domestically-based organizations that are committed to long-term
involvement with the targeted constituency. Nondomestic organizations usually
cannot commit sufficient time and are vulnerable to expulsion if their work is
perceived to conflict with state and national interests (Bratton 1989). However,
international organizations can route support to domestic organizations engaged in
this work.

Improving access to shared resources
The potential of livestock-based interventions is sharply constrained by the
environment within which producers work. As long as poor producers lack sufficient
arable land, they will depend on common and open access resources—village pastures,
nearby forests, community waterholes—and therefore are affected by declines in
resource conditions and vulnerable to restrictions on access.88 Land redistribution is
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For example, some adivasis view the grazing and joint/community forest management conflicts as part of a
broader struggle for preservation of their livelihoods that is taking place in multiple arenas—the courts, the
bureaucracies, the forest.
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Social movement research shows that civic skills and existing networks provide important resources for issuespecific advocacy (Brady, Verba, and Schlozman 1995).
88
Purchase of inputs such as fodder would require expenditure of scarce resources
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not a feasible near-term option, but any measures that improve the condition of
common resources have the potential to enhance producers’ livelihoods.
There are a number of central and state government, NGO, and donor initiatives
underway to improve conditions on common lands, in forests, and in watersheds. Propoor producer interventions in this arena might involve raising awareness of
producers’ needs and advocating on their behalf.
Because most government
initiatives are led by departments other than animal husbandry, livestock producers’
interests are unlikely to be high priority. The Andhra Pradesh Forestry Committee
represents an important exception. The representation of livestock producers on this
committee, along with Forestry and Animal Husbandry officials, provides a venue
through which producers can advocate livestock-friendly policies. In other cases,
NGOs are well situated to develop interventions that incorporate producers’
concerns,89 and donors can encourage governments to adopt these approaches.90
Animal Husbandry officials can seek inclusion in initiatives that affect livestock
producers. Advocacy and producer organizations may be able to resist imminent
threats—such as forest closure—but they generally lack capacity to continually monitor
and proactively engage with these contextual issues. The large number of initiatives,
their dispersion across government departments, donors, and NGOs, and the lack of
coordination among initiatives, poses a challenge to information collection and
monitoring. In the absence of greater coordination, donors can support monitoring
efforts by sharing information and providing resources for monitoring.

Encouraging & enabling pro-poor animal health sector reforms
There are major livestock sector reforms underway in Andhra Pradesh and Orissa,
including marketization of the animal health services. Some sector participants
believe that the marketization of health services is inherently anti-poor; provision
should be the responsibility of the state, not the private sector. Whether these views
are valid or not, it seems highly unlikely that their proponents have sufficient political
leverage to prevent marketization. Marketization fits within a liberal framework that
enjoys support from leading political actors at the state (Andhra Pradesh), national
(BJP), and international levels (international financial institutions and donors)
(Pedersen, 2000).
There has not been broad popular mobilization against
marketization, most likely because changes to date have had little impact on the
ground. Because producers were already paying for health services, the imposition of
fees has not led to dramatic changes. If more substantial changes—full privatization
of health services—are implemented, their impact is likely to be felt only after the
changes are close to irreversible. Without mass unrest or a change of views among
key actors, resistance is unlikely to succeed.
If one accepts that some form of marketization will be implemented, then the focus
turns to ensuring that reforms are implemented in a neutral or pro-poor fashion.
Realizing this potential requires that the departments of animal husbandry develop
new capacities and commitments—provision of preventative care, supervision of
private practitioners, monitoring of private markets, targeting of resources towards
the poor—in a resource-constrained environment. There is some evidence of
commitment to pro-poor reform within the animal husbandry bureaucracy of Orissa,
but it exists only in pockets among high-level appointees and civil servants with strong
ties to NGOs. Lower level civil servants are more likely to be concerned with retaining
job security in the face of privatization. Thus, pro-poor implementation requires
building departmental capacity and developing incentives for pro-poor behaviour.
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For example, Society for the Promotion of Wastelands Development-Andhra Pradesh tank restoration
programs have encouraged villages to plant fodder trees near the bore wells.
90
Many of the government initiatives receive significant support—technical assistance, grants, and loans—from
international donor organization.
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The incentive problem arises from the shift in health service provision towards semipublic goods such as prevention and extension. These services are likely to provide
fewer private benefits to service providers than curative services,91 and thus providers
have an incentive to focus on curative interventions. This incentive problem is not
insoluble—linking observable prevention efforts to promotions or bonuses is one
option—but it needs attention. Efforts to address this issue would work with the selfinterest of service providers, and thus may garner support from veterinarians and
paraveterinarians.
Marketization is a key component of the health service reforms planned for Andhra
Pradesh and Orissa. In this context, efforts to target resources towards poor
producers should engage with geographic access to services. At present, governmentsubsidized services are distributed unevenly, and some areas have much less access
than others. Because the ill-served areas are unattractive in terms of local wealth,
transport, and amenities, privatization of practice is unlikely to attract professional
practitioners to these areas.92 Intervention in the form of subsidy (of private practice
in poor areas) or targeting (of government practice) may be necessary. One approach
would be to direct the resources freed by reducing government subsidy of breeding
(through the Livestock Development Agencies) and animal health services (through
reduced hiring) toward access in underserved areas; this would require strong
advocacy and departmental leadership. One could assign a substantial share of
remaining government veterinarians to these areas—providing continued job security
in exchange—and/or provide a bonus to government or private veterinarians and
paraprofessionals who work in these areas.
While government animal health
practitioners may resist placement in underserved areas, it is not clear that these
practitioners possess sufficient political strength to resist this change given clear
commitment by departmental and political leadership. Bilateral organizations and
well-connected domestic pro-poor organizations should focus initial advocacy in this
area.
The interventions discussed above vary in the extent to which they are likely to
encounter resistance. Capacity building efforts would provide departments with new
resources; these efforts may be welcomed. Addressing the public goods incentive
problem may not be a priority for government officials, but it is unlikely to pose a
threat. Efforts to influence marketization and accountability, on the other hand, may
encounter resistance.
Influencing the reform process requires access to the
bureaucracy. Engaging with the incentive problems is probably least demanding; welldeveloped ideas may be adopted by departments if they do not require substantial
change.
Capacity building and implementation efforts also need continued
involvement—a presence on the ground. Those with access can provide state
departments with resources to build civil servants’ skills in new areas, educate new
appointees93 on reform issues and advocate pro-poor strategies, and conduct research
on unanswered reform questions. Departmental insiders and allied professionals,
donors, and friendly or apolitical NGOs are likely to possess sufficient access to
departmental staff and leadership. Of these, bilateral organizations are most likely to
have resources, an explicit commitment to the poor, and a presence on the ground,
but it is not clear whether these organizations will remain involved for the long-term.
Other international organizations are likely to lack sufficient local presence.
Departmental leaders may have access but their involvement is unlikely to be long91

As was discussed previously, service recipients’ willingness to pay depends on the individual (private)
benefits they receive. Semi-public goods provide collective and private goods, but recipients will consider only
the private goods. Curative services provide mostly private goods. As a result, the market price for cures is
likely to be higher than that for prevention.
92
It is assumed that all practitioners will charge for their services. However, service is likely to be less
remunerative in very poor and remote areas.
93
Appointments to the ministry and secretariat are driven by other considerations and this is unlikely to
change. Appointees are subject to frequent extradepartmental transfers
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term; ministers and secretaries are subject to frequent transfer. Other insiders,
allied professionals and friendly organizations are less likely to prioritize the interests
of poor producers, especially when these would impose costs on animal health
professionals. Where they exist, however, domestic organizations that possess both
friendly relations with the state department and a commitment to the poor are wellsuited to encourage pro-poor reform. Activist organizations—those that take public
stances critical of the department—are likely to be excluded from the reform process,
and thus limited to seeking leverage from outside. Still, these organizations could be
effective in putting poor producers’ issues on the reform agenda. Orissa informants
indicated that the department is relatively open, and some individuals and
organizations have influenced reform in a pro-poor direction; this dynamic was less
evident in Andhra Pradesh.

Dairy sector: Reducing intervention and increasing competition
To date, dairy sector interventions have focused on productivity (breed improvement)
and cooperative marketing and processing. Cross-breeding improvement efforts have
met with little success. Culling restrictions and low inputs of feed and fodder by poor
producers pose daunting barriers.
Past cooperative development efforts have created a useful infrastructure that
performs well below its potential; poor producers who own dairy cows or buffalo
garner some benefit from cooperative milk marketing. Interventions that continue to
focus on marketing and processing may benefit poor producers. Two reforms have
particular potential. One, actors can pressure state governments to reduce their
interference in the cooperatives so that members can hold these organizations
accountable for their performance. Implementation of the new cooperative laws
would grant cooperatives substantial autonomy from government and accountability
to their membership. Member accountability does not guarantee performance, but
managerial accountability to politicians inhibits performance.
Two, actors can encourage increased competition in the formal dairy sector;
competition from the informal sector is already a reality. While the current situation
has developed through a complex history, there is no obvious reason why cooperatives
or private companies should enjoy a monopoly over milk collection, processing, and
marketing. Reforms implemented to date have reduced barriers to entry, but local
monopolies over formal sector milk collection seem common. It also seems to be the
case that cooperatives do not compete for milk collection. Allowing multiple
cooperatives to function in a collection area could increase the performance focus of
all cooperatives.
Although reform would diminish opportunities for patronage, supporting these reforms
is fairly uncontroversial. These initiatives are consistent with a liberal market
framework. Private companies support reduced barriers to entry and the leading
cooperative voices (NDDB and GCMMF) advocate reduced intervention. Thus, actors of
all sorts may be effective in this area. International organizations and domestic
organizations can advocate these reforms and provide technical support to those
cooperative societies that decide to become independent.

Small ruminant sector: Improving feed and fodder, researching
markets & breeding
Ownership of small ruminants is concentrated among the poor, and thus this area is an
important one for pro-poor interventions. The persistence and growth in goat rearing
in the face of indifference and occasional hostility from policymakers provides clear
evidence that these animals are profitable. Informants indicated that scarce fodder
and restricted access to health services impose substantial costs. It is likely that small
ruminant rearing is much less profitable than it could be. Interventions that focus on
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feed and fodder issues could have pro-poor effects.94 The central feed and fodder
issue involves access to grazing lands. Small, marginal, and landless producers depend
heavily on common lands and forests; loss of access would threaten many livelihoods.
However, these resources are both declining in condition and increasingly subject to
access restrictions. Policymakers have found it easier to exclude goats—owned by the
poor—than cows. Small ruminant rearers and advocates in Andhra Pradesh have
engaged in defensive struggles on this issue, but external actors—especially donors—
could alter the content and tenor of common/state property debates by treating small
producers, including sheep and goat rearers, as legitimate participants and insisting
that donor-supported projects do not damage the welfare of poor producers.
Efforts to improve the welfare of small ruminant rearers are constrained by lack of
information on important issues. Research in this area would contribute to future propoor interventions. Two important starting points are marketing and breeding.
Marketing research could focus on the commodity chain. There is little research on
the commodity chain that links rural meat producers to regional and urban markets,95
but there well be many places in which the linkages could be improved to the benefit
of producers and consumers. Breeding research could examine the status of
indigenous breeds and consider the options for improvement. Because there are no
restrictions on culling, there may be greater potential for genetic improvement
programs to succeed.
The small ruminant policy environment in Andhra Pradesh and Orissa are quite
different. In Andhra Pradesh, as mentioned, the political environment has been fairly
hostile to small ruminants, and rearers and advocates have engaged defensively.
However, producers in the subsector are relatively well organized. In contrast, the
Orissa State Livestock Sector Policy acknowledges the importance of small animals and
includes a brief section on meat animals. The policy can provide a point of entry for
actors who wish to address the issues raised above. Interventions in Orissa will be
constrained by the limited self-organization of small ruminant rearers.

94
95

Health service issues have been discussed.
A substantial share of meat is consumed locally.
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